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This paper investigates the impact of demographic shocks on optimal decisions about
saving, life insurance, and, most centrally, asset allocation. We analyze these choices
within the framework of a life-cycle model that features exogenous changes in family
composition, heterogeneity in lifetime income, and uninsurable 
uctuations in earnings
and medical costs. Our analysis indicates that marital-status transitions and children
can have important eects on optimal household decisions. Widowhood induces sharp
reductions in the portfolio shares in stock, and the impact is largest for women and
individuals with children. Divorce causes men and women to reallocate their portfolios
in dierent directions; men choose much riskier allocations, while women opt for safer
ones. Children play a fundamental role in the optimal portfolio decisions. Men with
children, for example, increase their shares in response to divorce by less than half
as much as men without children. Comparing our simulation results with panel-data
evidence on stockholding from the PSID and the HRS, we conclude that changes in
marital status and children matter empirically as well, but not always in the ways that
the model predicts.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines how marital status and children aect optimal life-cycle saving and
asset allocation decisions. When people marry, have children, or separate through divorce
or widowhood, they can experience dramatic changes in their nancial positions. Wealth
increases or divides; spending needs change in relation to housing and children; and new
expectations are formed regarding future income, longevity, and bequests. Although these
are not, strictly speaking, exogenous events, family transitions constitute an important
source of risk, with the potential to aect everything from wealth accumulation (Cubeddu
and R os-Rull, 2005; Scholz and Seshadri, 2007) to the demand for life insurance (Hong and
R os-Rull, 2006).1 Viewed as a source of background risk, there is reason to expect that
these shocks to family composition also play a role in determining the demand for risky
assets.2
This possibility motivates our current study, in which we examine how \family shocks"
aect optimal decisions about consumption, life insurance, and asset allocation over the life
cycle. Our framework builds on a growing body of life-cycle models that explore dierent
aspects of household portfolio decisions.3 We incorporate undiversiable labor income risk
(Bodie et al., 1992; Heaton and Lucas, 2000; Viceira, 2001), an altruistic bequest motive
(De Nardi, 2004; Laitner, 2002), out-of-pocket medical expense risk (French, 2005; Hubbard
et al., 1995; Palumbo, 1999), a market for life insurance (Fischer, 1973; Hong and R os-Rull,
2006), evolving spending needs (Attanasio et al., 1999), exogenous shocks to marital status
(Cubeddu and R os-Rull, 2005), and an explicit treatment of children (Scholz and Seshadri,
2007). Together, these elements compose a life-cycle model in which households exposed
to family shocks must make optimal decisions about consumption, life insurance, and asset
allocation in an environment characterized by risky asset returns, labor earnings, medical
costs, and mortality.
While most of the components of our modeling framework have been developed in pre-
1Cubeddu and R os-Rull (2005) and Hong and R os-Rull (2006) investigate the eects of exogenous
changes in marital status on wealth and life insurance. Scholz and Seshadri (2007) study wealth accumulation
in a model with exogenous and endogenous fertility.
2Several studies demonstrate the theoretical and empirical tendency for background risk to reduce the
share of risky assets. See, for example, Koo (1998), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Kimball and Elmendorf
(2000), Viceira (2001), and Haliassos and Michaelides (2003).
3Research on optimal portfolio choice over the life cycle continues to expand. It includes work on the
tendency of housing to crowd out the risky allocation of the young (Cocco, 2005; Yao and Zhang, 2005;
Hu, 2005), the ability of xed costs to explain low observed rates of participation (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002;
Gomes and Michaelides, 2005), the eect of luxury goods and nonhomothetic utility on the relationship
between wealth and allocation (Wachter and Yogo, 2007), the role of medical expenses as background risk
(Luo, 2006; Love and Perozek, 2007; Pang and Washawsky, 2007), and the interaction between portfolio
choice and the demand for annuities (Horne et al., 2007). The foundation of our model, however, derives
from the life-cycle asset allocation studies of Cocco et al. (2005), Gomes and Michaelides (2005), and Cocco
(2005), and from the normalized buer-stock consumption model of Carroll (1997).
2vious studies, ours is the rst life-cycle paper, to our knowledge, to include an explicit
treatment of shocks to both marital status and children.4 It is also the rst life-cycle paper
on portfolio choice to focus on either marital status or children as a source of background
risk.5 That family shocks have received relatively scant attention in the life-cycle portfolio
choice literature is, perhaps, surprising. After all, marital status and children almost cer-
tainly aect household resources, preferences, and background risk, and these elements lie
at the heart of any analysis of optimal asset allocation and wealth accumulation over the
life cycle.
As an illustration of how children and marital status might aect individual portfolio
decisions, imagine that a couple with two children living at home gets a divorce. Depending
on the legal assignment of custody, the mandated level of child support, anticipated earnings,
and the division of household wealth, the ratio of wealth to the present value of future income
for each spouse will almost surely dier from the level previously observed in marriage. As
Bodie et al. (1992) demonstrate, this ratio is key to understanding optimal asset allocation
because it summarizes, at least in part, the exposure of future consumption possibilities
to 
uctuations in nancial markets. The wealth-to-income ratio, however, is not the only
channel connecting divorce and portfolio choice. Background risk may also be aected
in this example since the former spouses move from living on a combined income to each
relying on a potentially more volatile single stream. As several studies have shown, this sort
of uninsurable background risk, arising, for example, from labor income, business income,
and housing, can have a quantitatively large impact on optimal portfolio decisions.6 A nal
way that the divorce might in
uence optimal portfolio choice is through its eect on savings
as the former spouses update their desired consumption of housing, food, transportation,
and child care. Taken together, these changes in wealth, income, and desired consumption
may lead to large adjustments in the optimal portfolio of nancial assets.
Intuition for the importance of family shocks also comes from recognizing that mari-
4Section 2 describes how our assumptions about marital status transitions dier from the processes in
Cubeddu and R os-Rull (2005) and Hong and R os-Rull (2006) and how our fertility process diers from the
processes considered in Scholz and Seshadri (2007).
5The importance of family eects for understanding savings patterns has, however, received attention
in the empirical life-cycle consumption literature. The pioneering studies are by Attanasio and Browning
(1995), who demonstrate the importance of family eects for explaining the excess sensitivity of consumption
to income, and Browning and Ejrns (2002), who argue that the precautionary saving motive may be
unnecessary to explain the rise in saving early in the life cycle once one controls for children. Scholz and
Seshadri (2007), however, show that simply controlling for variation in family size is not enough to reconcile
the life-cycle model's predictions with observed consumption patterns. It is the interaction of family size
with precautionary eects that is necessary to explain the empirical distribution of wealth.
6See Koo (1998) and Heaton and Lucas (2000) for examples of calibrated models of optimal portfolio
choice that incorporate background risk in an innitely-lived representative agent setting. Studies solv-
ing nite-period models include Viceira (2001), Bertaut and Haliassos (1997), Haliassos and Michaelides
(2003), and Gomes and Michaelides (2005). For more citations and a summary of the empirical evidence on
background risk, see Curcuru et al. (2004).
3tal status and children may have important interactions, in addition to their independent
eects on household decisions. Returning to our previous example, contrast the economic
implications of divorce for the two-child couple with those of a childless couple. Members
of the childless couple will still experience a change in wealth and income in the event of
a divorce, but there will be no additional shock to resources due to child support, college
expenses, or dierences in scale economies related to the assignment of custody. Given
this dierential impact on resources, it is reasonable to expect that the childless couple
will respond dierently to divorce in terms of saving and portfolio choice. In addition,
children may also alter households' responses to widowhood. For example, depending on
the strength of the bequest motive, surviving spouses with children will tend to have larger
amounts of wealth relative to income compared to those without children, leaving them
more exposed to market risk.
Previous studies support the intuition that children and marital status can have large
eects on life-cycle saving decisions. Scholz and Seshadri (2007) simulate wealth distri-
butions generated by a model that includes both exogenous and endogenous fertility and
conclude that children have a substantially larger eect on net wealth compared with the
eects of means-tested social insurance programs, which were themselves shown to have a
large impact on the wealth accumulation of lower-income households (Hubbard et al., 1995).
In terms of marital status, Cubeddu and R os-Rull (2005) and (Hong and R os-Rull, 2006)
conclude that the risks associated with changes in marital status can have a substantial
eect on the evolution of wealth and the demand for life insurance.
The contribution of our paper is to demonstrate that, in addition to their eects on
wealth and life insurance, family shocks can also have a large impact on optimal portfolio
decisions. The importance of family shocks can be seen, at the broadest level, by comparing
the average wealth and portfolio shares across marital status categories and the presence
of children. We nd that households with children tend to accumulate substantially less
wealth during the working years but that their slower rates of drawdown in retirement leave
them with more savings toward the tail end of life. This trajectory of wealth accumu-
lation is mirrored, in part, by the evolution of portfolio shares. Earlier in the life cycle,
households with children hold riskier portfolio shares (by about 10 percentage points) than
households without children, but the relationship reverses in retirement. Following the logic
in Bodie et al. (1992), a riskier allocation for these younger households is optimal because
their consumption streams are less dependent on the performance of nancial markets. In
retirement, however, children provide an incentive to maintain wealth for bequests, and the
resulting increase in the wealth-to-income ratio makes households increasingly sensitive to
stock market volatility. Looking at the average shares alone, however, does not tell us how
changes in marital status aect portfolio decisions at the time of the shock.
4To examine the direct response of portfolio allocations to changes in family composition,
therefore, we conduct two separate experiments. In the rst, we compute the average change
in the portfolio shares at the time of a marital status transition, with an adjustment for
the \typical" change experienced by households who did not undergo a change in marital
status. This experiment is designed to uncover the eects of family shocks on households
whose particular wealth and income levels are the outcomes of simulated life-cycle histories.
In the second, we examine changes in the decision rules themselves, which allows us to trace
out the response of the portfolio shares over a range of wealth-to-income ratios.
Both experiments demonstrate the importance of the interaction between marital status
and children, particularly in the cases of divorce and widowhood. In the simulation exper-
iment, for example, working-age men without children respond to divorce by tilting their
portfolios toward stocks by 10 to 20 percentage points. Those without children, in contrast,
increase their shares by one-half to two-thirds as much. Divorce aects the shares of men
and women in opposite directions. While women respond to divorce by choosing a safer
allocation, men move toward a riskier one, resulting in a net dierence in allocations by
gender of about 20 percentage points. Widowhood leads to sharp downward adjustments
for both men and women, but the eects are largest for women and individuals with chil-
dren. The decision rules experiment provides some insight into how changes in the optimal
share vary with wealth. The decision rules indicate that marital status and children have
the largest in
uence at lower levels of wealth (but not so low that stocks strictly dominate
the safe asset) and that the impact of children on portfolio decisions is largest for divorced
working-age men and smallest for retired widows.
The predictions generated by the model suggest that children and marital status may
indeed be important determinants of savings and portfolio choice. We test this prediction
using panel data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Panel Study on
Income Dynamics (PSID). The marginal eects estimates from panel tobit regressions on
the portfolio share in stocks provide preliminary evidence that marital status and children
in
uence portfolio decisions. For example, many of the estimates on the marital status
indicator variables are in the 5{10 percentage point range, and a number are statistically
signicant. The signs, however, do not always agree with the patterns in the model sim-
ulations. For example, while the PSID regressions estimate a 6.3 percentage point decline
in the stock share for divorced, high school-educated women, which is consistent with the
model's predictions, no such empirical relationship emerges for college graduates.
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of demo-
graphics and household portfolio choice and characterize the solution. Section 3 discusses
the parameterization of the model and our procedure for matching the median wealth levels
in the data. Section 4 presents our main ndings from the model simulations, and Section
55 compares those results with panel-data evidence in the HRS and the PSID. The nal
section concludes.
2 The Model
Our economy extends the life-cycle asset allocation models in Cocco et al. (2005) and Gomes
and Michaelides (2005) by introducing marital status transitions (as in Cubeddu and R os-
Rull, 2005), life insurance (as in Hong and R os-Rull, 2006), and children (as in Scholz and
Seshadri, 2007).7 Individuals dier by age t 2 f20;:::;100g, education e 2 fhigh school,
collegeg8, sex g 2 fmale, femaleg, marital status m 2 fnever-married, married, divorced,
widowedg, and the number and ages of children.
Children are born according to fertility probabilities that depend on age, education, and
marital status, and they remain in the household until age 18. From ages 18 to 22, children
attend post-secondary school that is nanced by the parents. As we explain in the following
section, the ages of the children can be fully summarized by two discrete state variables:
the number of children born before the mother is 30, ne, and the number of children born
when the mother is 30 or older, nl (e and l stand for \early" and \late"). Together, ne and
nl sum to the total number of children born to an individual, denoted n.
Throughout their life cycles, individuals face exogenous changes in marital status (e.g.,
from married to divorced), with probabilities that depend on age, education, and gender.9
We describe the process governing marital transitions in greater detail in Section 3.3. For
notational compactness, it will be helpful to let  = fm;g;e;ne;nlg index a household by
7Cubeddu and R os-Rull (2005) and Hong and R os-Rull (2006) model the eects of marital status
changes on wealth and life insurance in a general equilibrium setting. While children enter the preferences of
households in their model, they arrive deterministically in accordance with the population growth rate of the
economy. Scholz and Seshadri (2007), in contrast, simulate household wealth in a model that abstracts from
changes in marital status but that introduces children both exogenously and endogenously. Our treatment
of children diers from Scholz and Seshadri's in two respects. First, whereas their exogenous specication
of fertility deterministically xes the number and ages of children, ours assumes that children are born
probabilistically, in accordance with data on natality. This uncertainty allows birth itself to represent a
source of family shocks. Second, the specication of children in our model introduces some uncertainty
about the spacing of children by distinguishing between early and late births.
8Although we also estimated and solved the model for individuals with less than a high school degree, we
focus on high school and college graduates because the results for the lowest two categories are qualitatively
similar and because the observed rates of stockholding for high school dropouts are quite low.
9The assumption that marital status and children evolve exogenously rules out some interesting, and
potentially important, interactions between risk preferences and decisions about marriage and fertility
(Schmidt, 2008). We do not model endogenous fertility, as is done in Scholz and Seshadri (2007), be-
cause of a technical restriction on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). The most common way
of modeling endogenous fertility is to adopt the quantity/quality framework of Becker and Barro (1988).
This framework requires, however, that the 
ow utility must be positive in order for households to optimally
choose a non-zero number of children. With CRRA preferences, 
ow utility will be non-zero if and only if
the coecient of relative risk aversion is less than 1, a restriction that generally leads to corner solutions of
100% stock holding in models of portfolio choice.
6marital status, gender, education, and number of children.
At the beginning of each period t, households form expectations about resources and
demographic transitions and select a combination of consumption Ct, life insurance Zt, and
a portfolio share of the risky asset &t to achieve the standard goal of maximizing expected
lifetime utility.10 The preference structure for married couples diers from that of singles,
and we describe them in turn.
2.1 Preferences for a single household
Single households (m 6= married) enter each period with cash on hand Xt, out of which
they consume, purchase life insurance, and save for future consumption and bequests.
Expenditures must be nanced out of a combination of savings from the previous pe-
riod, Rt+1(Xt   Ct   Zt), and income net of medical expenses, taxes, and housing costs,
(1   ht+1;0)Yt+1;0, where 0 denotes the household's index in the next period, Rt+1 is the
stochastic portfolio rate of return, ht+1; is the fraction of income spent on housing, and
Yt+1;0  0 is non-asset \post-government" income (net of taxes and public transfers).
In addition to the possibility of changing marital status, individuals alive at age t face a
probability 1 pt; of dying before the next period that depends on age, sex, marital status,
and education. In the event of death, an insurance benet Qt+1 increases the amount of
cash on hand available for bequests, where Qt+1 = 	tZt is a linear function of the premium








Xt+1 = Rt+1(Xt   Ct   Zt) + (1   ht+1;0)Yt+1;0 + t+1;0Pt+1;0 + Qt+1 (2)
Rt+1 = R + (Re
t+1   R)&t (3)
Xt  Ct + Zt (4)
0  &t  1: (5)
10We rule out the possibility of endogenous annuitization because annuity markets are thin and because
adding an annuity decision would complicate the household's choice problem. Studies that explicitly model
imperfect annuity markets nd that households tend to purchase more annuities as they age (Horne et al.,
2007) and that the demand for annuities depends on the extent of background risk arising, for example,
from health expenses (Pang and Washawsky, 2007). A well-developed market for annuities would provide
households with an important lever for hedging against mortality risk. Empirically, however, the demand
for private annuities is quite thin|potentially optimally so (Benitez-Silva, 2003).
11Technically, the value function also takes permanent income as an argument. We omit the argument for
compactness and because we will eventually normalize the problem by permanent income.
7In the equations above, ut;(:) is the period utility function,  is the discount factor, Et is
the expectations operator, Pt+1;0 is the level of permanent income, and Bt;(:) is a bequest
function. Expectations are taken over the distribution of returns, permanent and transitory
income, births, and marital status transitions. t+1;0 denotes the change in assets (as a
fraction of permanent income Pt+1;0) that occurs when a household experiences a change
in marital status. If there is no change in marriage, divorce, or widowhood, t+1;0 = 0.
Finally, the portfolio return Rt+1 is a weighted average of the gross risk-free rate R and the
gross risky return on equities Re
t+1.
Current utility depends on age, gender, and marital status because of household economies
of scale, which are themselves a function of the number of adults and children living in the
household. Each member of the household derives iso-elastic utility from consumption ad-









where  is the coecient of relative risk aversion, 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, and t; is the household equivalence scale. Only households who have children















if n > 0
0 if n = 0;
(7)
where b determines the curvature of the marginal value of bequests. The bequest function
is similar to the one used in Gomes and Michaelides (2005), except that in our specication,
the value of bequests depends on the number of children. The marginal value of bequests
12Some previous papers specify an Epstein-Zin utility function in order to separate risk aversion from
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), which in the CRRA specication are inverses of each
other. The main advantage of separating risk aversion and the willingness to substitute intertemporally
has to do with the participation margin of stock holding. As discussed in Gomes and Michaelides (2005),
households with low risk aversion and low intertemporal elasticity are the ones most likely to stay away from
the stock market when there are modest participation costs. A high intertemporal elasticity of substitution
increases the desire to save, which in turn increases the demand to participate in the stock market. Thus, the
Epstein-Zin specication helps the model capture an important aspect of stockmarket participation in the
U.S.|namely, low income households tend to save little and hold zero stocks. Conditional on participation,
however, a model with Epstein-Zin utility still generates the counterfactual prediction that households with
the lowest wealth-to-income ratios will place the highest fraction of their wealth in stocks. We do not model
Epstein-Zin preferences because the primary goal of the paper is to explain patterns of stock allocation
rather than participation, and because the recursive nature of those preferences increases the time necessary
to compute optimal consumption.
13The bequest motive does not take into account the optimal wealth and portfolio decisions of the children,
which could well be important for the allocation decisions of parents intending to leave an inheritance. The
parents' and children's decisions would ideally be jointly determined in the model, but this kind of nested
solution raises complications that are beyond the scope of this current paper.
8for a households with children is B0
t;(Xt) = [(b
p
n)=Xt], which for  > 1 is increasing in b
and n and decreasing in Xt.
2.2 Preferences for a married couple
The married household's problem is complicated by the fact that spouses must choose
consumption, insurance, and a portfolio allocation while having potentially competing in-
terests in terms of future preferences. Following Cubeddu and R os-Rull (2005) and Hong
and R os-Rull (2006), we assume that married couples solve a joint maximization problem
with weights m and f = 1   m on the husband's and the wife's preferences. We assume
further that a married couple is constrained to enjoy the same consumption in period t, but
that future choices can dier in the event of a separation due to death or divorce. Because of
competing interests within the household, a spouse's current marginal utility will typically
not equal the expected marginal value from his or her future consumption stream.
We depart from Cubeddu and R os-Rull (2005) and Hong and R os-Rull (2006) by
assuming that spouses place an altruistic weight  on each other's value function in the event
of death. Motivation for this assumption comes from the following thought experiment.
Imagine that a married couple learns with perfect certainty that the husband will be dead
the following year. In the absence of altruism, the husband would pressure the wife to go
on a household consumption binge with him in the current period, eating into resources
that would otherwise be available to the wife later as a widow. (The husband receives
no utility in the next period, while the wife's expected marginal value is reduced by the
decision weight f.) As a result, the wife would be forced to reduce consumption following
her husband's death, leading to a sudden increase in her marginal value function. If, on
the other hand, spouses value each other's utility in widowhood, they would be less apt to
negotiate for higher current consumption because of mortality discounting. Since altruism
for the other spouse is unlikely to obtain in the event of divorce, we assume that spouses
place no weight on the other's utility in the post-divorce state of the world.
Letting  denote the opposite gender's index, we can write the married household's




ut;(Ct) + (1   pt;)(1   pt;)EtBt;(Xt+1)
+m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pt;EtVt+1;0(Xt+1) + pt;(1   pt;)EtVt+1;0(Xt+1)
io
;
subject to equations (2)-(5). The expectations in the value function are taken over marital
status, children, mortality (and therefore insurance payouts), asset returns, and income
9shocks. The rst term, ut;(Ct), is the utility that each spouse receives from the household
consuming Ct in the current period. The next term captures the value each spouse receives
from leaving his or her children the remaining wealth Xt+1, which includes the death benet
Qt+1. (We make the simplifying assumption that a married couple purchases life insurance
only for the husband.) The third term represents the weighted value function of the husband,
which takes into account the wife's utility in the event he leaves her a widow. The nal
term represents the symmetric value function for the wife.
2.3 Income
Following Carroll (1997), we decompose household income into permanent and transitory
components. The permanent component Pt+1;0 depends on the previous realization of
permanent income Pt;, a demographic trend Gt+1;0 that depends on both current and
future demographic states (the notation suppresses the dependence on ), and a log-normally
distributed shock Nt+1;0. Income in period t + 1 equals the permanent realization times
the transitory shock t+1;0.
Yt+1;0 = Pt+1;0t+1;0 (9)
Pt+1;0 = Gt+1;0Pt;Nt+1;0; (10)













There are two things to note about this formulation of income. First, the trend com-
ponent of permanent income depends on age, education, gender, marital status, household
size, child support, and college expenses, and is therefore subject to shocks as households
move from one demographic state to another. A movement from married to divorced, for
example, would lead to a sharp decrease in the value of Gt+1;;0, both because of the direct
impact of divorce on earnings and because of the indirect eect of child support payments.
Second, although the notation suppresses the distinction, the shocks to permanent and
transitory income dier across the working and retirement portions of life. For workers,
variation in income comes predominantly from changes in productivity and unemployment,
while for retirees, much of the variation comes from out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Our formulation of income net of taxes and medical costs implicitly assumes that out-of-
pocket medical expenses are proportional to permanent income.
Apart from the inclusion of life insurance and demographic transitions, the formulation
of the single household's value function is standard. The married couple's problem, however,
involves a few more complications.
102.4 Solving the model
The solution to the model consists of a set of decision rules for life insurance, portfolio
allocation, and consumption.14 For each age t, household type , level of cash on hand Xt,
and permanent income Pt;, we approximate these decision rules by numerically solving a
representative household's rst order conditions. Because the structure of the rst order
conditions for married couples parallels that for singles (with additional terms to keep track
of the other spouse's utility), we describe the single household's problem and leave the
married couple's as a straightforward extension.
The assumptions of iso-elastic utility and bequests, in addition to the unit root in income,
allow us to normalize the problem by permanent income and solve the last period's problem
for each household index . Letting lowercase variables denote the normalized versions of







t+1;0vt+1;0(Rt+1at= t;0 + (1   ht+1;0)t+1 + t+1;0)





where vt;(xt) = Vt;(Xt)=P
1 
t is the normalized value function, at = xt   ct   zt is the
amount of savings at the end of period t,  t+1;0 = Gt+1;0Nt+1;0 is the stochastic growth in
permanent income, and qt+1 = 	tzt is the life insurance payout in the event of death.
2.4.1 First order conditions
With an approximate version of (11) in hand, we can calculate period t's optimal decisions
by solving for the values of zt, &t, and ct that satisfy the following rst order conditions.
Life insurance: The envelope condition requires that u0
t;(ct) = vx
t;(xt), and we can write
the rst order condition with respect to life insurance zt as15
pt;EtRt+1u0
t+1;0( t+1;0ct+1;0)+
(1   pt;)Et(Rt+1   	t)B0
t;(Rt+1at + qt+1) = 0; (12)
where ct+1;0 is next period's decision rule for consumption:
ct+1;0(xt+1) = ct+1;0(Rt+1at= t;0 + (1   ht+1;0)t+1 + t+1;0): (13)
14For a detailed introduction to solving models of this type, see Carroll (2006) and Carroll (2007).
15In deriving the rst-order conditions, we take advantage of the property that the marginal utility











t;([Rt+1at + qt+1]= t+1;0) = B
0
t;(Rt+1at + qt+1).
11In equation (12), the rst term represents the utility loss due to the cost of purchasing life
insurance. Each dollar of life insurance reduces next period's cash on hand by Rt+1, causing
a reduction in expected utility of pt;EtRt+1u0
t+1;0( t+1;0ct+1;0). The second term captures
the net expected marginal benet associated with an additional dollar of life insurance:
Insurance reduces expected bequethable assets by Rt+1, but there is also an expected payout
equal to 	t dollars. The optimal level of insurance sets the expected net marginal gains to
zero.







t;(Rt+1at + qt+1) = 0: (14)
Except for the terms related to marital status (e.g., the transition parameter t+1;0 inside
ct+1;0) and life insurance (e.g., qt+1), this is the standard rst-order condition for portfolio
choice. The optimal share of risky assets balances the higher expected returns of a portfolio
weighted toward stocks with the utility costs of increased volatility.





t;(Rt+1at + qt+1): (15)
Given end-of-period savings at, and decision rules for life insurance and the stock share, we
can immediately determine the value of consumption by rst taking the expectations of the
marginal value function and then applying the inverse marginal utility function to the result.
As Carroll (2006) explains, this can lead to impressive gains in computational eciency as
long as we are willing to work with end-of-period savings at rather than beginning of period
cash on hand xt.
3 Estimation and Calibration
Most of the parameters and transition processes in the model depend either directly or
indirectly on the composition of the household|on marital status and on the number and
ages of children. This section details the nature of this dependency and describes how it
aects our estimation of the model's key parameters. The rst part of the section discusses
the parameters most directly linked to household nance and net wealth|the age proles
and covariance structures of income, the evolution of housing costs, the change in wealth due
12to a marital transition, the asset return process, and the structure of life insurance. The next
part discusses the specication of children in the model|when they are born, how they are
spaced, and what they imply for child support payments and college expenses. The section
then turns to the transition process governing movements between marriage, divorce, and
widowhood. It concludes by describing household preferences and the estimation procedure
for matching the model's simulated wealth levels to those in the data.
3.1 Income, Housing, and Assets
3.1.1 Income during the working life
Income depends on education, age, gender, marital status, and the number and ages of
children. We estimate age proles of pre-retirement income and their associated covariance
structures using unbalanced panel data from the 1980{2003 waves of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). Our denition of income is a broad, post-government concept
that sums household labor earnings and public transfers and subtracts income taxes and
payroll taxes of the household head and the spouse, all converted into 2006 dollars using the
CPI-U.16 We restrict the sample to respondents aged 20{65 with no additional adults apart
from a spouse living in the household and with incomes between $3,000 and $3,000,000.17
Finally, to maintain a nationally representative sample of households, we eliminate obser-
vations from the SEO oversample of low-income households.
We estimate xed-eects regressions of the natural logarithm of after-tax income on
a full set of age dummies for the respondent, and the numbers of children in dierent age
brackets living in the household. Because we have insucient data to obtain clean estimates
for each marital status subsample (i.e., married, never-married, divorced, and widowed), we
instead run separate regressions for single men, single women, and married couples in each
education group.18 Following Cocco et al. (2005) and others, we obtain our income proles
16Our denition of income is similar to that in Cocco et al. (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
Public transfers include AFDC, unemployment compensation, SSI, food stamps, and other welfare payments.
We exclude asset income and private transfers (child support, alimony, and income receipts from other non-
household members) from our denition because we model these as separate processes.
17We exclude observations with additional adults in order to obtain tighter estimates on the average income
proles and variance processes for the family structure modeled in our paper. Allowing for cohabitation (with
no legal protection of assets or income) would introduce an additional source of income variation that cannot
be perfectly absorbed through a linear control for family size. While the exclusion of these households makes
little dierence for the estimated average income proles (apart from sharply increasing the signicance of the
estimates on the age dummies), it does generate slightly smaller estimates for the transitory and permanent
variances. In terms of our restriction on income, we drop households with very low levels of post-government
income (i.e., below $3,000) because we are concerned about measurement error, and we drop those with very
high incomes (i.e., above $3,000,000) to reduce the in
uence of rich outliers.
18Note that even if we were able to obtain clean estimates of the income processes for each of our model's
marital status categories, we would then confront an even stronger question about the exogeneity of the
dierences across marital states. For example, a never-married male in the data might earn less than a
13by rst tting a third-degree polynomial to the age dummy coecients in each specication
and then modeling retirement income as a constant fraction of nal working-period income.
We estimate these fractions, or replacement rates, by rst running xed-eects regressions
of log income on age dummies for respondents aged 55 to 90 in the 1992{2006 waves of
the HRS. For each marital status, gender, and education group, we dene the replacement
rate as the average income implied by the age dummy coecient estimates for ages 55{62
divided by the implied average income for ages 67{80.
Table 1 reports the tted polynomial coecients, replacement rates, and coecient
estimates on the number and ages of children living at home. The sign pattern on the age
polynomials generates familiar hump-shaped income proles, shown by marital status and
education in Figure 1. The results in the table indicate that younger children living at home
reduce the average incomes of single females and married couples. (The estimates for single
males are very imprecisely estimated and essentially irrelevant since our model assumes
that, except in the case of widowhood, women are the custodial parents.) We incorporate
the eects of children into our income process by rst tting a quadratic through the age
dummy coecients and then normalizing the resulting function so that children have no
eect on long-term income.19 The normalized process implies that college-educated single
females experience a decrease in household income of about 25% with the birth of a child,
which tapers o to a 0% change 18 years later. The initial change for a single female
high school graduate is about 15%, and the change for married couples in each education
category is around 7%.
We estimate the variances of permanent and transitory income following the decomposi-
tion procedure in Carroll and Samwick (1997).20 The estimated transitory and permanent
variances for each of our educational groups are reported at the bottom of Table 1 and fall
within the range of estimates in Carroll (1992) and Cocco et al. (2005).
3.1.2 Retirement income net of medical costs
During the working years, 
uctuations in after-tax income derive primarily from spells of
unemployment, job changes, and productivity shocks. Retirement income, however, consists
of regular payments from Social Security, pensions, and other annuities, which tend to be
typical divorced male of the same age and education, but that doesn't mean that the transition to and from
marriage is responsible for the dierence.
19We assume that additional children lengthen the period of income loss but that they do not lead to
further decreases in income (i.e., we do not multiply the age coecients times the number of children).
20The decomposition is as follows. Let r
d
t denote the d-period dierence between the unexplained part of







can estimate the permanent and transitory variances by regressing V ar(r
d
t) on a vector of d's and a vector
of 2's. To reduce bias induced by possible serial correlation in the transitory component, we only include
vectors of r
d
t for d  2.
14stable over time. But while income payments in retirement may be relatively constant,
out-of-pocket medical expenses can lead to large 
uctuations in annual resources (French
and Jones, 2004b). We attempt to capture this shift in the source of risk by estimating
the variance process of after-tax retirement income net of out-of-pocket medical costs using
the 1992{2006 waves of the HRS. We dene net retirement income as the sum of Social
Security benets, dened benet pension payments, annuity 
ows, government transfers,
SSI, veteran's benets, and other sources of non-asset income less annualized out-of-pocket
medical costs. We restrict the sample to respondents aged 60 to 90 with net retirement
incomes between -$20,000 and $1,000,000.
Our estimation of net retirement income follows our procedure for pre-retirement income.
For each education category, we estimate a xed eects regression of log net retirement
income on a full set of age dummies and a constant.21 Applying the decomposition in
Carroll and Samwick (1997), we estimate permanent variances of 0.0125 (s:e: = 0:0026)
and 0.0281 (s:e: = 0:0027) and transitory variances of 0.0784 (s:e: = 0:0070) and 0.0767
(s:e: = 0:0075) for high school and college graduates, respectively.
3.1.3 Income transitions due to marriage or divorce
The fact that we have separate income proles for singles and married couples raises the
issue of how to deal with transitions in household income due to changes in marital status. If
we simply assume that marital transitions trigger a switch from one prole to another, there
is a consistency problem in that nothing guarantees that a married couple's income is equal
to the combined incomes of the two spouses if they were single. While there are, naturally,
reasons to expect that these incomes would dier in practice because of endogenous changes
in labor supply and occupational choice, our specication is not rich enough to take these
into account.
Instead, our approach assumes that the immediate changes in household income with
marriage are due entirely to the combining of the individual income streams. We ensure
this by making adjustments (typically very small ones) to the growth rate in permanent
income implied by our income proles.22 These adjustments to the growth rate of permanent
21To allow for negative values of net retirement income, we apply the log transformation: f(z) = ln(z+1)
if z  0, and f(z) =  ln( z + 1) if z < 0.
22Ignoring, for the moment, the eects of age, housing, child support, and college costs on income growth,
let ym, yf, and y be the estimated levels of permanent income for single males, single females, and married
couples. We rst compute the ratio of a single male's expected income to a single female's expected income,
g = ym=yf, which we use to determine the relative contributions of the husband and wife to the married
couple's household income. We then solve for the adjusted incomes, ^ ym and ^ yf, such that ^ ym + ^ yf = y.
Using the denition of g, we nd that ^ yf = y=(1+g) and ^ ym = gy=(1+g), which by construction sum to y,
the married couple's income. The growth rate in permanent income due to marriage is given by G = y=^ ym
for men and G = y=^ yf for women. In the case of divorce, we apply a similar adjustment. For example,
divorced men experience a change in household income of G = ^ ym=y.
15income have the advantage that we can retain the dierences in the shape of the income
proles across marital status without losing the consistency condition that incomes \add
up" in marriage.23
3.1.4 Housing
The ratio of housing costs to permanent income, h;t, depends on family composition and
therefore needs to be estimated separately by household type. Gomes and Michaelides
(2005) estimate the ratio of annual mortgage and rental costs to income by regressing the
housing expenditure ratio on a cubic age polynomial and a set of time dummies. We follow
a similar approach and estimate separate xed-eects regressions for dierent education,
marital status, and gender subsamples in the 1980{2003 waves of the PSID for respon-
dents aged 20 to 75. Our denition of income|post-government income, excluding private
transfers and asset income|is the same as the one used in our estimates of PSID income.
We restrict the sample to households with annual housing costs less than income and drop
households with annual housing costs in excess of $1,000,000. The resulting coecient esti-
mates, reported in Table 2, imply declining or hump-shaped proles of housing cost ratios
in the range of 15 to 25 percent for most of the working life. Because the proles imply
negative housing costs at more advanced ages, we set the minimum housing cost ratio in
the model to zero.
3.1.5 Wealth changes due to change in marital status
When couples divorce in the model, we assume that they divide assets equally and pay 10
percent of total assets in divorce costs (meant to capture legal fees and ineciencies related
to the splitting of assets). Although this 50/50 rule is exactly consistent with the community
property divorce laws currently in place in nine U.S. states, it probably overstates the
equality of division for the majority of states applying some from of equitable distribution,
under which assets are divided according to judicial discretion (Stevenson, 2007).24
With marriage, households experience an increase in wealth due to the merging of
the spouses' assets. Ideally, we would like to estimate the eect of marriage on wealth
for each age, education, and marital status group in our model. The PSID and HRS,
however, contain insucient information on marital transitions to obtain such estimates.
(For example, only about 1.5{2% of PSID households report a transition from divorce
to marriage, and splitting the sample into age, education, and marital status cells leads to
23We also solved the model without requiring the incomes to sum up in marriage. In practice, the
adjustments make a relatively small dierence in our results since the estimated income proles for married
couples are already quite close to the sum of the income proles for single men and women.
24The nine community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
16very imprecise estimates.) Instead, we take an alternative route and assume that individuals
marry a person with the median ratio of wealth to income for the relevant age and education
group, with adjustments to make sure that the median combined assets equal the sum of
the two individual's assets.
Let wf and wm denote the median wealth levels for single females and single males of a
particular age and education group, and let y be the estimated level of a married couple's
permanent income. We assume that f = wm=y and m = wf=y, so that the increase in
wealth due to marriage is scaled by permanent income. Implicitly, this is tantamount to
assuming that marriage is assortative along the dimension of permanent income|men with
high permanent incomes marry women with high permanent incomes, and each therefore
see a larger absolute increase household wealth upon marriage.
We estimate the increase in household wealth due to marriage for dierent age, gender,
education, and marital status groups using data from the 1999{2005 wealth supplements
in the PSID and the 1992{2006 waves of the HRS. We begin by computing the median
ratios of wealth to income for single males and single females in each education group for
5-year age brackets from 20 to 95. We then t fourth-degree age polynomials through the
median wealth levels to obtain estimates for wf and wm for the entire range of age values,
which, when normalized by a married couple's expected permanent income, generates our
estimates of t+1;.25
In terms of altruism, we assume that spouses do not care about each other's future
utility in the event of a divorce but that they place full weight on each other's utility in the
event of widowhood. That is, we set  = 1.
3.1.6 Asset returns
As is common in the literature on life-cycle portfolio choice, we set the risk-free rate to 1.5%
and the equity premium to 4%.26 Equity returns are assumed to be distributed lognormally
25As an alternative approach to handling the merging of assets, we also estimated the median change
in wealth due to marriage using panel data in the PSID and the HRS. We ran median regressions of the
change in log nancial wealth on an indicator variable for transitioning to marriage and other time-varying
household characteristics. The estimated eects of marriage on wealth range from a low of about 0.2 for
divorced males in the PSID to about 1.7 for divorced females in the HRS, with most values in the range of
0.5 to 1. We solved the model assuming that transformed versions of these estimates governed the changes in
wealth due to marriage across all age and education groups. While the results not surprisingly diered from
the ones reported in our paper, they generated similar qualitative predictions in the sense that the simulated
changes in savings and portfolio allocations due to marriage and children moved in the same direction and
with similar orders of magnitude.
26Yao and Zhang (2005), Cocco et al. (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005), for example, choose
an equity premium of 4% and a risk-free rate of 2%. We choose a slightly lower risk-free rate to match
the long-run return on short-duration U.S. Treasury Bills, estimated to fall between 1% and 1.5%. Mehra
and Prescott (2008), for example, estimate the real return on short-maturity Treasury bills (and equivalent
securities before 1931, when Treasury bills were introduced) to be 1.31% in the period 1889{2005. The
standard assumptions about risk aversion (i.e., a CRRA coecient between 1 and 5) adopted in the literature
17with the possibility of correlation between returns and permanent income. As in Campbell
and Viceira (2002), we set the standard deviation of annual equity returns to 15.7% and
choose a baseline correlation coecient between equities and permanent income of 0.15 (as
in Cocco et al. (2005)). Given the importance of this correlation for the stock allocation
decisions of younger workers, we also experiment with alternative values of this parameter.
3.1.7 Life insurance
Following Fischer (1973), we assume that households can purchase one-period term life
insurance each period they are alive, regardless of marital status. As a simplication, we
assume that married couples only purchase insurance for the husband, but that singles of
either gender can buy life insurance that pays out to their children. Insurance is assumed
to be actuarially fair, so that the face value of life insurance in present value terms always
equals the premium divided by the probability of mortality for the individual purchasing
the plan: FVt = Zt=(1 pt+1;), and the payout in period t+1 is RZt=(1 pt+1;). Finally,
we do not allow households to purchase insurance in period T   1 since they will die with
certainty in the following period.27
3.2 Children
3.2.1 Births, Timing, and Spacing
We need to specify how children are \born" in the model, how they are spaced, and what
they imply for college expenses and child support payments. We assume that children are
born stochastically, with probabilities that depend on age, education, and marital status.
For tractability, we assume: (1) that mothers cannot give birth after age 40, (2) that females
give birth to no more than 4 children in either the \early" or \late" periods, (3) that children
born within each period are evenly spaced two year apart, regardless of the actual spacing
on life-cycle consumption generate 100% stock allocations for a risk premium that matches the long-run U.S.
average of 6% (Campbell et al., 1997). A risk premium of 4%, in conjunction with a relatively high coecient
of relative risk aversion of 5, delivers the more interesting case of an interior allocation decision.
27The assumption that households purchase one-year term policies is obviously at odds with the term
lengths of most life insurance policies in the U.S., which tend to fall between 10 and 30 years. The reason
we do not model longer-term policies is that it would require that we introduce a computationally expensive
state variable: the remaining duration of the term. In addition, it is not clear that longer term lengths would
make an important dierence in our model. In an economy with complete, and economically fairly priced life
insurance, the price of an actuarially fair 30-year term policy would be equivalent to the present value stream
of prices associated with buying one-period life insurance for each of the 30 years separately. Thus while
there may be interesting issues related to the indivisibility of longer-term policies (such that a household
would value the option not to be insured in some years), there is nothing fundamentally problematic with
modeling a one-period term policy.
An additional concern with our formulation is that real-world insurance pricing is generally not actuarially
fair, with average loads of 1.5{2 (Eisenhauer and Halek, 1999). We do not model these loads, however,
because they imply much lower holdings of life insurance than we observe in the data.
18generated by realizations of the stochastic process, and (4) that the age of the mother when
the rst child is born is determined by the number of children and whether the rst birth
was early or late|early if the rst child is born when the mother is younger than 30, and
late if the rst child is born when the mother is 30 or older.28
The ages of the children are determined by the age of the mother at the rst pregnancy
in each period, early or late. We assume that the mother has the rst child in the early
period at age 27 if just one child is born in that period, 26 if two children are born, 25 if
three are born, and 24 if four are born. For late births, we assume that the mother is 34 if
one child is born in the late period, 33 if two children are born in that period, 32 if three
are born, and 31 if four are born.29
We calibrate the birth probabilities using fertility data published in a U.S. National
Center for Health Statistics report (1997). The report publishes fertility rates by race,
education, and marital status for the age brackets. We construct fertility probabilities for
ages 20{40 by tting a third-degree polynomial through the reported probabilities (evaluated
at the median age in each bracket). The resulting process produces an average number of
children per household of about 1.7 for all three education groups, which is slightly lower
than the value of 1.8 for non-Hispanic white women reported in the 2000 U.S. Census (Bachu
and O'Connell, 2001).
3.2.2 College
We assume that all children attend college from age 18 to 22. Although this overstates
college attendance rates in the U.S., it is actually consistent with most parents' expectations.
A recent analysis by the National Center for Education Statistics, for example, showed that
\[a]bout 9 in 10 students (91 percent) in grades 6 through 12 had parents who expected them
to continue their education beyond high school" (Lippman et al., 2008).30 Our simplifying
assumption that all children attend college implicitly acknowledges that we know little
about the process and timing of parents' expectations regarding college expenses.
28The rst two assumptions limit the number of children in the state space. The third assumption
eliminates the need to keep track of an enormous number of potential birth spacings. The nal assumption
introduces some uncertainty about the children's ages, without requiring us to keep track of the mother's
age at rst birth. If, alternatively, we allowed children to be born at all ages between 20 and 40, we would
multiply the state space (assuming no multiple births) by 2
21, the number of unique binary strings with a
length equal to the number of child-bearing years (ages 20{40).
29For example, suppose that two children are born in the early period and one child is born in the late
period. When the mother is 45 years old, the children will be ages 11 (= 45   34), 17 (= 45   26), and 19
(= 45   26 + 2). We also experimented with dierent spacing and timing rules and found that our results
are robust to alternative specications.
30The report based its ndings on data from the 2003 Parent and Family Involvement in Education Survey.
Among the students whose parents expected them to pursue education beyond high school, about 71 percent
had parents expecting them to complete a bachelors degree or higher. The remaining 29 percent had parents
expecting them to complete \some post-secondary schooling."
19We model college expenses as a fraction of permanent income. Turley and Desmond
(2006) compare the amount that married and divorced parents spend on college for their
dependent children and nd that married couples spent about 9% of income per year on
each child's college education, while divorced parents spent about 7% of income. Except at
very low income levels (below $20,000), they nd that the income share of college costs is
relatively constant across the income distribution for married couples. For divorced parents,
in contrast, the share of college costs rises substantially at higher levels of income (above
$40,000).31 For simplicity, we assume that married couples and divorced parents spend
identical fractions of permanent income on college expenses for each child. Given the rise
in college costs since the Turley and Desmond study, we assume that parents spend 10% of
permanent income per year on college costs for each child.
3.2.3 Child support
We model child support after the income sharing formulas adopted by most states.32 We as-
sume that the non-custodial parent is male and that he must pay a percentage of permanent
income in child support as long as the child is under 18. The percentages are taken from
the State of Wisconsin's child support guidelines: 17 percent for one child, 25 percent for
two children, 29 percent for three children, 31 percent for four children, and 33 percent for
ve or more children.33 In addition, we make the following three assumptions: (1) that the
ratio of the male parent's income to the female parent's income is the same for all couples
of a given age and education, and (2) that remarriage is assortative along the dimension of
children (e.g., a man supporting two children from a former marriage will remarry a woman
receiving child support for two children from her former spouse), and (3) that any children
born out of marriage result in child support payments for men and child support receipts
for women.
31Turley and Desmond proer several theories to explain the rise in the share for divorced parents. One
explanation they put forth is that higher income divorced parents were more likely than lower income
divorced parents to interpret the survey question as asking about the combined contribution from both
parents, including the ex spouse. If this is the case, it is not clear whether higher-income divorced parents
actually spend a higher fraction of income on college expenses.
32See Bartfelt (2000) and Roberts (1994) for a discussion of the evolution of federal and state guidelines
for child support. Child support guidelines vary across states, but the majority adopt a variant of \income
sharing," which generally takes two forms. The rst, the percentage-of-income method, links child care to a
percentage of the non-custodial parent's income, with no adjustment for the income of the custodial parent.
The second, the income shares method, assesses child support obligations according to the share of the
combined custodial and non-custodial income. About 33 states have adopted the income shares approach,
while about 13 states have adopted the percentage-of-income method.
33The State of Wisconsin's child support guidelines, the rst implementation of the percentage-of-income
method, were based on calculations of child costs from the Child Support Project of the Institute for Research
on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.
203.2.4 Equivalence scales and children
Following Scholz et al. (2006), we adopt the scale factor recommended by Citro and Michael
(1995): nt;g;i = (A + 0:7K)0:7, where A and K denote the number of adults and children
living at home in period t. As discussed in Citro and Michael (1995), this formulation allows
the equivalence scale to distinguish between household composition eects (the dierent
consumption requirements of adults relative to children) and economies of scale.
3.2.5 A simple example of how marital changes aect household resources
Given that the model has a number of \moving parts," it might be helpful to consider a
simple example of how changes in marital status aect household resources in the model.
Table 3 displays the changes in permanent income, child support, wealth, and equivalence
scales due to transitions to marriage, divorce, and widowhood for 40-year-olds with a 13-
year-old child. The man and the woman in the example each have permanent incomes of
$25,000 before a transition to marriage, while the married couple has $50,000 in permanent
income, $200,000 in initial wealth, and a life insurance policy for the husband with a death
benet of $100,000.
The changes in permanent income with marriage re
ect assortative matching; men in
the model always marry women with lower incomes, and the dierence is determined by the
ratios of their relative income proles (shown in Figure 1). Wealth increases with marriage
according to the median levels held by single men and women in the data (see Section
3.1.5); it divides equally in the case of divorce; and it rises for the woman in the event of
widowhood because of life insurance. Child support obligations and receipts are washed
out in marriage, and the change in equivalence scales re
ects whether children are living at
home following a marital transition.
3.3 Mortality, marriage, and divorce
Household heads of each gender must occupy one of ve states at the beginning of each
age. They can be married, divorced, widowed, never married, or deceased. We estimate
transition probabilities between these states as a function of age, marital status, and gender
using reported coecient estimates from the Urban Institute's Model of Income in the Near
Term, Version 5 (MINT5). Originally designed for the Social Security Administration's
(SSA) Division of Policy Evaluation, MINT5 estimates income and demographic processes
using pooled data from the 1990{2001 Surveys of Program Participation (SIPP) and SSA
les of past earnings and benets.
To model transitions across all demographic states, we need information on the proba-
bilities of divorce, marriage, and mortality. The MINT5 report (Smith et al., 2007) presents
21estimates of continuous-time hazard models for separate divorce and marriage equations for
men and women. The MINT5 report also calibrates the original MINT's mortality hazard
estimates to match the Social Security Oce of the Actuary projections. We base our tran-
sitions on the pooled-sample estimates reported in Table 2-1 (marriage hazard for males),
Table 2-2 (marriage hazard for females), Table 2-3 (divorce hazard for males), Table 2-4
(divorce hazard for females), and Table 2-5 (mortality hazards for males and females).34
Using our estimated marriage, divorce, and mortality functions, we then construct sep-
arate demographic transition matrices for male- and female-headed households. For con-
sistency, we require that the probability of divorce within a married couple is the same for
each spouse, so that they agree on the odds of separation. We do not, however, adjust
our matrices to match the number of spouses of each type at every age as in Hong and
R os-Rull (2006). In this, and in all other respects, our model economy represents only a
partial equilibrium.
3.4 Preference specication and moment-matching procedure
In our baseline simulations, we set the coecient of relative risk aversion  equal to 6,
which is well within the range of typical values assumed in studies of portfolio choice.35
Convention provides less guidance, however, for the bequest specication. Some studies
choose bequest parameters to match data on the transfer wealth share in the economy and
the distribution of bequests across dierent income categories (De Nardi, 2004). Others
use bequests to match mean or median wealth holdings among households (French, 2005;
French and Jones, 2004a; Cagetti, 2003). Our interest in bequests lies in their eect on
life-insurance decisions during the working life and wealth spend-down patterns in old age.
34We make several adjustments to the MINT5 estimates in the divorce, marriage, and mortality equations.
The mortality equations for males and females in MINT5 include covariates for age, education, marital status
(never married, divorced, and widowed), indicators for disability status, and a measure of the household's
deviation from their predicted income. Our mortality function includes most of the coecient estimates, but
we omit the disability adjustment and the measure of permanent income since it is unclear how to map the
MINT5 denitions of these concepts into our model. Still, the MINT5 estimates allow for dierential mor-
tality along the dimensions of gender, marital status, and education, the last of which is strongly predictive
of our model's notion of permanent income.
We make more extensive adjustments when converting the marriage and divorce estimates into functions
appropriate for our model. The most signicant of these involve the issue of duration. The MINT5 specica-
tions assume that the likelihood of marriage depends on the number of years a person has been unmarried,
and that the likelihood of divorce depends on the number of years a person has been married. Keeping
track of this information in our model would require carrying around a pair of computationally expensive
state variables for the appropriate durations. Instead, we assume that previously married individuals have
been unmarried for 5 years (never married individuals are assumed to have been unmarried in a number
of years directly proportionate to their age) and that married individuals have been married for 10 years.
We also experimented with assumed durations of 3 and 15 years and found that the resulting change in the
probabilities of divorce had little eect on households' responses to family shocks.
35For example, Cocco et al. (2005) set the coecient of relative risk aversion to 10, which is at the upper
end of the range, while Cocco (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) each assume a value of 5.
22Because the ratio of wealth to future income plays such a fundamental role in portfolio
decisions, it is important to match the empirical values of this ratio as closely as possible.
We focus on matching wealth levels, but we do not calibrate our model to match observed
patterns of stock allocations. Conditional on stockmarket participation, studies of optimal
portfolio choice, including ours, nd that simulated allocations tend to decline during the
working years, which is at odds with the age path of stock shares observed in the data.36 The
lack of an age trend is apparent in both the PSID and the HRS. Table 4 reports the average
shares for dierent age and marital status groups in the PSID (for ages 20{50) and the HRS
(for ages 50{80), conditional and unconditional on holding positive amounts of stock. Apart
from an increase in the shares at age 50, which re
ects the higher average stockholding in
the HRS, the shares change relatively across age and marital status categories. The average
shares conditional on participation, for example, range from 43{50 percent in the PSID and
from 55{60 percent in the HRS.
We select the values of the discount factor  and the bequest parameter b that provide
the closest t between our simulated cash on hand levels and the values observed in the
data. Similar structural estimation exercises can be found in Gourinchas and Parker (2002),
Cagetti (2003), and French (2005).37 We focus on the discount factor and the bequest pa-
rameter, rather than the coecient of relative risk aversion, because the typical estimates
of risk aversion (0.50{4.25) generate optimal allocations in the risky asset that are con-
centrated at 100%.38 Further, because higher degrees of patience and a stronger bequest
motive each increase the wealth to income ratio toward the end of life, the two parameters
are partial substitutes in terms of identifying parameters.
Let 
 = f;bg denote the pair of parameters used to match the empirical medians.
We base our estimate on medians, rather than means, because they are more appro-
priate for matching the savings behavior of the typical household within each education
and marital status group. For each age bracket ai 2 fa1;a2;:::;ang and marital status
36Empirical studies of life-cycle allocations generally nd no clear evidence of an age trend in portfolio
shares after controlling for year eects (see, e.g., Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and Poterba and Samwick
(2001)). The problem of matching empirical allocation paths, conditional on stockmarket participation,
remains even after controlling for endogenous housing investment. In his study of housing and portfolio
choice, Cocco (2005) shows that the age pattern of housing investment can go a long way toward matching
the level of unconditional stockholding in the PSID data. Conditional on participation, however, their model
still predicts higher-than-observed allocations in the risky asset.
37Gourinchas and Parker (2002) use the simulated method of moments to estimate the combination of
risk aversion and the discount rate that match the average consumption proles for dierent education and
occupation groups. French (2005) structurally estimates the proles of labor supply and assets to study
retirement behavior in the presence of income and health uncertainty. Our estimation exercise is closest,
however, to Cagetti's (2003), which estimates the value of the discount factor and risk aversion that match
median net wealth proles in the PSID and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
38It should be noted that even though our choice of risk aversion is higher than the values estimated in
the studies, Cagetti (2003) nds that increasing the coecient of relative risk aversion from the estimated
value of around 4 to a higher value of 6 has little eect on the simulated wealth paths.
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In practice, we consider 5-year age brackets from ages 20 to 95 and search over a discrete
set of 
.39 For the younger age brackets, up to age 65, we compute the median wealth-
to-income ratios using the PSID wealth supplements. For the rest, we use the 1992{2006
waves of the HRS.
Figure 2 compares the empirical median values of cash on hand (net wealth plus current
income) with the simulated levels from models solved with the pairs of discount factors and
bequest motive that minimize the criterion function above. For high school graduates, we
estimate  = 0:9215 and b = 3:25, with a sum of squared deviations equal to 2.57. For
college graduates, we estimate  = 0:9050 and b = 4:00 with a sum of squared deviations
equal to 4.81. As shown in the gure, the t between the simulated ratios and the data
is quite close for most of the life cycle but deviates somewhat toward the end of life. The
imperfect match at the tail end of life is due to the fact that we are simultaneously matching
wealth levels for three separate household types. Thus, for example, while we underpredict
wealth accumulation in retirement for single men, we overpredict it for single women.
Our estimated values of  are on the low end of the estimates in the literature (0.93{
0.96 in Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and 0.92{0.99 in Cagetti (2003)). The reason for the
dierence in estimates can be attributed to the fact that we assume a relatively high degree
of risk aversion. As Cagetti (2003) notes, higher degrees of risk aversion induce households
to save more for precautionary purposes, and this implies a lower estimate of patience to
match the same median wealth to income ratios.
4 Optimal decisions about savings, life insurance, and port-
folio choice
How do family shocks aect optimal savings, life insurance, and portfolio choice? In this
section, we address this question by rst examining how the average levels of these variables
(across a large number of model simulations) dier by marital status, education, gender,
and children. We nd that the average age proles dier substantially by marital status
and children, which we interpret as preliminary evidence that family shocks can indeed
39We choose a grid of  values spaced 0.0005 apart and a grid of b values spaced 0.25 apart.
24have a large eect on household saving decisions. Just looking at average proles does
not, however, provide a clean experiment to identify the direct eects of marital status
transitions and children on optimal saving and portfolio choice. To analyze the direct eect
of these transitions, we perform two exercises. In the rst we show how the average portfolio
allocation of a typical household|typical in terms of demographics, wealth, and income|
changes in response to a given marital status transition. In the second we examine the
decision rules directly and trace out the portfolio responses to dierent family shocks across
a range of wealth-to-income levels. The results from both sets of experiments indicate that
changes in marital status can lead to large adjustments in savings and portfolio choice.
4.1 Life cycle proles
As a benchmark parameterization for each education group, we set the coecient of relative
risk aversion  = 6 and the correlation between stock returns and the permanent component
of income corrr;y = 0:15. The solution to the model consists of a set of interpolated policy
rules for life insurance, consumption, and portfolio allocation, which are each functions of
age, marital status, the number of children born in the early and late periods, and the
ratio of cash on hand to permanent income.40 With the decision rules in hand, we then
generate 50,000 life histories re
ecting independent realizations stock returns, permanent
and transitory income, marital status, births, and deaths. We initialize the histories by
randomly assigning 15% of the households to be married at the beginning of the working
portion of the life cycle, which approximates the initial distribution implied by our marital
status transition process. Finally, we solve and simulate the model for each of the three
education groups but focus the discussion of our results on high school and college graduates
since the qualitative results for the bottom two groups are quite similar.
Figure 3 displays the average life cycle proles of consumption, cash on hand, and the
face value of life insurance (the death benet) for male-headed households with a high
school degree (left plot) and for those with a college degree (right plot). Both proles show
a similar pattern of savings. Wealth builds up gradually until around age 50, after which
point it accelerates slightly to a peak near retirement age. The upturn in saving occurs right
40We solve the model backwards starting from the nal period T with a 60-point grid of xT spaced ac-
cording to a triple exponential that places more density on lower values of cash on hand (see Carroll, 2007).
Given pairs of c

T and xT, we construct a linear interpolating function for the nal period's optimal con-
sumption problem. Next, we discretize end-of-period savings at into another 60-point grid, also exponentially
spaced. For each value of at, we can solve for optimal life insurance, portfolio allocation, and consumption
using the rst-order-conditions given by equations (12), (14), and (15). Expectations of returns and income
are approximated using 10-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature, where we allow for correlation between equity




t , we can
endogenously recover the level of xt through the denition of end-of-period savings at = xt   ct   zt. The
solution to the life-cycle model then consists of interpolated decision rules c(xt), z(xt), and &(xt) for each
age, marital status, gender, and number of children born in the early and late periods.
25around the age at which children are exiting the household and nishing post-secondary
schooling. Households draw down their wealth in retirement but maintain relatively high
savings all the way to the maximum age of 100, re
ecting the importance of the bequest
motive for households with children. This pattern of an accelerating build-up of wealth
followed by a slow drawdown in retirement is even more pronounced for college graduates,
who have, on average, more hump-shaped income proles and stronger bequest motives.
The pattern of wealth displayed in the two panels of Figure 3 follows naturally from the
age pattern of consumption and life insurance purchases. Household consumption is hump-
shaped for both education groups and displays some small wrinkles around the ages at which
children leave home, when total consumption demand is lightened due to a reduction in the
equivalence scales. The acceleration of savings in the 15 years before retirement occurs as
consumption tapers o relative to income (not shown) and life insurance purchases decline.
Life insurance is purchased predominantly by younger married couples, who have the
most future income at stake in the event of an early and unexpected death. As these couples
age and accumulate assets, however, the concern becomes less that the death of a spouse
will reduce future income and more that the couple will outlive its nancial assets, making
life insurance less and less attractive. For high school graduates, the average simulated
face value of life insurance peaks around age 35 at $110,000 for the combined sample of all
households and at $153,050 for married couples, while for college graduates the peak occurs
a touch later in life at about $137,350 for all households and $190,060 for married couples.41
Hong and R os-Rull (2006) report data on life insurance from Stanford Research Institute
and nd that life insurance holdings for married couples in the U.S. peak around age 45 at
$170,000 (in year-2006 dollars), a bit later than our model predicts but roughly the same
magnitude.
The role of life insurance, which in part is purchased to protect desired bequests, raises
the question of how children aect wealth accumulation and portfolio choice over the life
cycle. On the one hand, children lead to an increase in household expenditures, private
transfer payments (child support), and college expenses and thus are capable of exhausting a
substantial portion of household resources. On the other hand, children might also promote
saving, with younger households preparing for future college expenses and older households
protecting desired bequests.
Figure 4 shows how the presence of children aects the average simulated age proles
of cash on hand and portfolio shares for high school and college graduates. The solid red
lines in the gure show the average proles for households without children; the dashed blue
lines show the proles for households with at least one child. The wealth proles in the top
41Life insurance holdings for singles are much lower|$28,600 and $42,620 for high school- and college-
educated men, and $13,800 and $6,760 for high school- and college-educated women|re
ecting the absence
of a spousal beneciary and the lower average number of dependents.
26two panels re
ect the competing saving eects of increased desired consumption and the
bequest motive. For both education groups, households with children tend to accumulate
substantially less savings during the working life, but their slower rates of drawdown in
retirement leave them with a larger amount of wealth as they age.
The bottom two panels of Figure 4 show that children also aect the age proles of port-
folio shares. During the working years, households with children tend to place about 5{15
percentage points more of their wealth in stocks relative to households without children. In
retirement, however, the average portfolio shares for households with and without children
cross and diverge markedly with age, re
ecting the increasing importance of preserving
bequests.
4.2 Eect of marital status and children on average life cycle proles
The importance of bequests and earnings proles in shaping savings and portfolio decisions
is consistent with the ndings in previous studies.42 The novelty of our analysis, however,
resides in showing how these decisions are aected by marital status and children. We
begin by comparing the average portfolio shares across dierent categories of age, gender,
education, marital status, and children. The average simulations highlight the heterogeneity
in portfolio allocations by household type, but they are somewhat limited in that they say
nothing about how individuals respond at the time of a shock, an issue we turn to in the
last two sections of the simulation results.
Table 5 reports the average portfolio shares for dierent combinations of age, gender,
education, marital status, and children. Perhaps the rst thing to notice about the table is
the considerable heterogeneity in the shares across household types. Single men hold more of
their wealth in stock than single women; college graduates tend to have more conservative
allocations than high school graduates; working-age households with children hold more
stock than those without children; and there are large dierences in the average shares
across marital status categories. Within each age bracket, many of the average shares dier
by as much as 15 to 25 percentage points. Just looking at the average portfolio shares for
all households therefore masks a fairly large source of variation across household types.
42Cocco et al. (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) trace the lifecycle proles of consumption,
wealth, income, and portfolio shares and nd that households tend to move toward a safer allocation as they
approach retirement. What happens to the simulated portfolio share after retirement depends on the relative
importance of income shocks, bequest motives, and the pace of wealth drawdown. Gomes and Michaelides
(2005), for example, nds that the share rises slightly and then falls in retirement, a result that stems from
the absence of income uncertainty in retirement and the growing importance of the bequest motive (they
select a bequest parameter b = 2:5) at later ages. Cocco et al. (2005), on the other hand, nd that the
optimal share tends to rise throughout retirement in their benchmark specication with no bequest motive.
In the absence of a bequest motive, the increasing rates of wealth drawdown with age make asset return
shocks less important for future consumption needs.
27Another pattern shown in the table is the striking asymmetry in the eects of divorce
and widowhood on the portfolio shares of men and women. Comparing the average shares
for married couples with those for divorced men and women, we can see that divorce is
associated with a fairly large increase in the average shares of men but either a decrease
(as in the case of college graduates) or only a slight change (as in the case of high school
graduates) in the average shares of women. The dierence in the impact of divorce is
largely due to the relative changes experienced by men and women in wealth, future income,
custody, and child support. While each spouse sees an immediate reduction in household
wealth of 55% (the 50/50 division plus legal fees) in the event of a divorce, men experience
a smaller decrease in future household income relative to women, and they are relieved of
custodial responsibilities for any children. Child support obligations oset part, but not all,
of the gender imbalance in committed expenditures and future income.
In terms of widowhood, the average shares indicate that the loss of a spouse is a far
more important event for the shares of women than for those of men. For example, while
the shares of widowed females with children are about 15 percentage points lower than
the shares of married couples with children, there is almost no dierence in the shares of
widowed and married men. The gender dierence in the response to widowhood is largely
the result of three factors that increase women's exposure to market risk relative to men's.
First, since couples purchase life insurance to protect only against the risk of losing the
husband's earnings, women, but not men, generally gain wealth with the loss of a spouse.
Second, in addition to experiencing an increase in wealth, women also face a sharper decrease
in expected future household income, with no osetting child support payments. Finally,
women also have a larger actuarial risk relative to men of outliving their wealth.
Dierences in portfolio shares by household type depend fundamentally on the average
levels of household wealth. For example, the average shares married couples with and
without children tend to diverge during the working years and then converge in retirement,
a pattern mirrored by the evolution of wealth shown in Table 6. Married couples with
children head into retirement with substantially less wealth than childless couples ($587,600
vs. $735,600 for college graduates). By ages 75{85, however, the strength of the bequest
motive reverses this relationship, and couples with children end up holding more wealth.
The slow pace of wealth drawdown among couples with children means that an increasing
amount of their future consumption and bequests must be paid for out of wealth, which
is subject to market volatility, rather than income, which is not. Similar patterns in the
portfolio allocations and wealth levels can be seen for other marital status groups as well.
Naturally, the response of portfolio choice to demographic shocks depends on much more
than just the change in the level of savings. Other factors include changes in the volatility
of income, increases or decreases in the equivalence scales, and expectations about future
28changes in marital status and children. To get a closer look at households' responses to
change in marital status, we now examine optimal savings behavior at the time of the shock.
4.3 Eect of changes in marital status and children on average portfolio
allocation
4.3.1 Changes in simulated portfolio shares
Table 7 reports the one-period detrended dierence in portfolio shares in response to a
change in marital status. For the baseline parameterization ( = 6, corrr;y = 0:15,  =
0:9215 and b = 3:25 for high school;  = 0:9050 and b = 4:0 for college), the table displays
the percentage-point change in the portfolio shares relative to the trend change for each
marital status category. The calculations detrend the changes in portfolio choice because we
are interested in the average change relative to the \typical" change in that year. Thus if we
are interested in the eect of divorce on the portfolio shares of 55-year-old men, we calculate
the average simulated change in the shares for men immediately following a divorce and
subtract from that the average change in the shares of those who remained married.43
Starting with the eects of divorce in Table 7, we can see that age, gender, education,
and children all have important interactions with the impact of marital status on portfolio
allocations. Particularly notable are the strong dierences by gender and the presence of
children. Among working age households, men respond to divorce by sharply increasing
their shares in stock by an average of about 15 percentage points, while women respond
by moving to a safer allocation. The presence of children, however, dampens the reponse
of men's portfolio shares to divorce by as much as 50 percent. For women, the interaction
between children and divorce is more complicated. Children limit the decline in the shares
of younger women (i.e., ages 30{40), have almost no eect on the shares for ages 45{55,
and lead to a slightly larger decline for ages 55{65. In contrast to divorced men, for whom
(in the model) children primarily represent a loss of income due to child support payments
and larger future outlays for college, women are assumed to retain custody of the children
and therefore experience an increase in desired household consumption that largely osets
the receipt of higher income in the form of child support.
Widowhood triggers dramatic adjustments in the average shares, particularly among
working-age women, who reduce their shares by 10 to 37 percentage points. At more
advanced ages, widowhood comes as less of a surprise, and the portfolio adjustments are
consequently smaller in magnitude. At all ages, widowhood leaves surviving spouses with,
43Note that this is only an approximation of the \typical" eect of a marital status transition since the
typical change is itself a function of wealth and income. To obtain a more accurate picture of the wealth
transitions, we examine below the changes in the decision rules themselves, which allows us to identify more
precisely the direct impact of marital status on the optimal portfolio share.
29at least, the full amount of household savings, which tends to magnify the impact of market
risk on future consumption and therefore utility. This eect is amplied in the case of
working-age women, who actually see an increase in wealth due to the life-insurance payout.
As with divorce, the impact of widowhood depends on the presence of children, varying by
as much as 8 percentage points in the case of working-age women.
Divorce and widowhood are not the only family shocks that can induce large changes in
the optimal portfolio share; transitions to marriage matter as well. Movements from divorce
to marriage generally trigger changes in the portfolio shares in the opposite direction of
those caused by transitions to divorce. Thus, for example, 55{65-year-old male high school
graduates increase their shares by about 16 percentage points following a divorce, and they
reduce their shares by about 14 percentage points when they remarry. This is not always
true for the case of widowhood. For example, while women tend to drastically reduce
their shares in response to widowhood, they make only minor adjustments in the event of
remarriage. In contrast to widowhood, which eectively holds wealth constant but reduces
future income, remarriage leads to a partly osetting increase in both wealth and income.
4.3.2 Changes in portfolio shares implied by decision rules
The change in the average portfolio shares at the point of a marital status transition tells
us about the response of a typical household, with a typical amount of wealth, income, chil-
dren, and asset returns. It is also interesting, however, to study the underlying mechanism
governing the response to family shocks|the direct responses implied by the decision rules
themselves. The decision rules allow us to analyze the exact change in the optimal portfolio
share for individuals with a particular set of state variables and to show how those decisions
vary across the full range of cash on hand to income ratios.
Let &t;(xt) be the optimal portfolio decision rule for a household of type . In the
following experiments, we will assume that the return on risky assets, the permanent income
shock, and the transitory income shock are all equal to their expected values, so that
Rt+1 = &tEtRe
t+1 + (1   &t)R =  R, and Nt; = t; = 1. The evolution of xt is given by
xt+1 =  R[xt   ct;(xt)   zt;(xt)]=Gt+1;0 + (1   ht+1;0) + ;t+1;
where ct;(xt) and zt;(xt) are the decision rules for consumption and life insurance.
A change in marital status can lead to a division or merger of assets (in which cases
t+1;0 6= 0), and it can lead to a change in trend permanent income, G0;t+1. Even in the
absence of a marital transition, there is likely to be a change in portfolio choice due to the
evolution of cash on hand relative to income, housing costs, and so on. We control for these
trend changes in portfolio choice by rst computing the time dierence in &t;(xt), allowing
30for a marital transition, and then subtracting the time dierence in &t;(xt), assuming  = 0.
The result, which we denote &, represents the change in the optimal portfolio share that
is strictly due to a change in marital status.
What do the decision rules imply about the eect of a transition from marriage to
divorce or widowhood? Figure 5 displays the values of & for childless male and female
high school graduates of select ages across a range of cash on hand to income ratios, xt. The
results for college graduates are shown in Figure 6. In the top panels, & is the change in
the optimal portfolio decision triggered by divorce, while in the bottom panels it represents
the change due to widowhood. At suciently low levels of xt, there is no change in the
portfolio shares because the optimal amount is stuck at a corner allocation of 100%. As the
level of xt rises beyond the threshold, however, the changes in the optimal shares increase
and then taper o toward zero, re
ecting the curvature of the decision rule as a function of
wealth (&x < 0 and &xx > 0).
As with the changes in the average simulated shares, the decision rules show that divorce
pushes the shares of men and women in opposite directions. Divorce induces a sharp down-
ward adjustment in the shares of 30- and 45-year-old women of as much as 25 percentage
points. (Approaching retirement, divorce induces a slight increase in the shares of women,
re
ecting the tendency for divorce to actually reduce women's overall exposure to nancial
risk by lowering the wealth to income ratio.) Men, in contrast, dramatically increase their
shares in response to divorce. The impact diminishes with age and the level of wealth (for
the same reasons it does for women), but all of the increases in the portfolio shares are in
the range of 10 to 40 percentage points. As explained above, divorce tends to make men
much less dependent on wealth to nance nancial future consumption, because they no
longer have to save to nance the expected consumption of a longer-lived, lower-earning
spouse, and because they experience a relatively large decline in wealth relative to income.
At all ages, widowhood induces large declines in the optimal portfolio shares, with the
largest movements for working-age women. In the bottom panels of Figures 5 and 6, the
portfolio shares for 45-year-old women drop by 10 to 40 percentage points, depending on
the level of xt. For ages 65 and 85, the decrease in the portfolio share in the risky asset is
half to two-thirds as large. Middle-aged women are more sensitive to the loss of a spouse,
primarily because the event comes as more of a surprise. The surviving spouse experiences a
sudden drop in future income relative to wealth, and this in turn makes future consumption
streams more sensitive to 
uctuations in the rate of return on risky assets.
The decision rules indicate that the optimal share in the risky asset responds to changes
in marital status. Figures 7 and 8 show how these responses depend on the presence of
children. The top panels of the gures display the changes in the portfolio shares for 45-year-
old males and females who have either no children (the solid red line) or three children (the
31dashed blue line). The bottom panels of the gures show how children alter the response
to widowhood for 80-year-olds. The top panels show that, especially for men, children
have a strong impact on the response of optimal portfolio shares to divorce. The presence
of children dampens the increase in men's portfolio shares by as much as 20 percentage
points, while it reduces the decline in women's shares by about 4 percentage points. The
bottom panels indicate that children amplify the eects of widowhood and that they have
a larger impact on the portfolio responses of men. Because of the dierences in the survival
probabilities between men and women, widowhood leaves men much closer to the age of
leaving a bequest, which increases the attractiveness of a safer allocation. The predominant
concern for widowed women, in contrast, is the loss of a larger stream of future income,
which happens regardless of whether there are children.
In both the average simulations and the decision rule experiment, the magnitudes and
even the signs of the response of portfolio choice to a change in marital status depend
on all of the state variables in the model|age, education, wealth, income, children, and
gender. Given the heterogeneity in responses, it is helpful to take a step back and ask what
one can conclude about family shocks and optimal portfolio choice. At the broadest level,
the results indicate that marital status transitions play an important role in savings and
allocation decisions and that children can amplify or dampen these eects. More narrowly,
the results show rst that widowhood leads to substantially safer allocations for both men
and women, with the strongest eects for women. Second, they show that divorce tends to
reduce the shares of women and increase the shares of men, with magnitudes that depend
crucially on the presence of children.
4.4 Robustness and sensitivity analysis
We test the sensitivity of our results to alternative assumptions about the coecient of
relative risk aversion and the degree of correlation between stocks and permanent income.
Table 8 reports select changes in the average simulated portfolio shares in response to divorce
and widowhood for men and women either in the middle of their working years (ages 45{
55) or in retirement (ages 75{85). The rst columns of the table repeat the baseline case
discussed above. The next pair of columns show what happens when we set the correlation
between returns and permanent income to 0. The columns titled \Low CRRA" show the
results for a value of  = 4, and the nal columns titled \High CRRA" show the values for
a value of  = 8. For each of the specications, we reestimate the values of  and b that
minimize the squared distance between the simulated cash-on-hand levels and those in the
data.44
44The values of  range from 0.8650 for college graduates with high risk aversion to 0.9650 for college
graduates with \low" risk aversion. The values of b range from 2.25 for high school graduates with low risk
32The results in the table show that the correlation between the risky asset and permanent
income has only a small eect on the impact of family shocks on portfolio decisions. Few
of the values in the table change by more than a couple percentage points when we remove
the correlation, and they all share the same sign. Increasing or decreasing the coecient
of relative risk aversion, in contrast, generates larger dierences in the response of shares
to divorce and widowhood. But even here, none of the signs or magnitudes would alter the
main story from the baseline simulation experiments.
5 Empirical evidence on family eects
Results from the model simulations predict that divorce and widowhood have a strong
in
uence on the share of risky assets. To test this prediction, we take advantage of the
panel dimension of the HRS and the PSID to estimate random-eects tobit regressions of
the risky share on household characteristics and marital status. Despite the drawbacks of
the random eects approach,45 we include the estimates to provide at least a broad picture
of the empirical relationship between marital status and portfolio choice. For younger
households (ages 20{70) we estimate regressions using the 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005 wealth
supplements in the PSID, while for older households (ages 60{90) we use the 1992{2006
waves of the HRS.
The dependent variable in the regressions is the stock share|the net value of stocks
(directly-held, mutual funds, and investment trusts) divided by net nancial wealth.46 We
estimate separate regressions for men and women and for three dierent marital status cat-
egories: \Divorced" includes respondents who are either divorced or married; \Widowed"
includes those who are widowed or married; and \Never-married" includes those who are
either never-married or married. The regressions include controls for race, health status,
wealth to income ratios (averaged over the sample periods), age, education, and year dum-
mies. The variables of interest are the three marital status/education interaction dummies,
the marginal eects estimates of which can be interpreted as the percentage point change in
the stock share associated with a particular combination of marital status and education.
Table 9 reports the marginal eects estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for
the HRS regressions of older households, and Table 10 reports the estimates for the PSID
aversion to 4.25 for college graduates with high risk aversion.
45The random eects tobit specication generates unbiased estimates only in the special case where the
unobserved eects, which are integrated out of the likelihood function, are uncorrelated with the observed
eects. In our specication, worrisome sources of unobserved heterogeneity include risk aversion (potentially
correlated with wealth, income, health, and possibly marital status), impatience, and nancial sophistication.
The infrequency of marital transitions leave us with insucient information to precisely estimate xed-eects
or correlated random eects specications.
46See Section 3.1.5 for a description of the data and the denition of net nancial wealth.
33regressions of younger households. Beginning with the HRS results, the top lines of the
Table 9 indicate that the portfolio shares in risky assets of divorced men and women are
between 2.2 and 4.0 percentage points lower than those of married households, with the
magnitudes depending mostly on education. The estimate on the divorce interaction for
high school graduates is statistically signicant at the 1-percent level, while the estimates on
divorce for the other marital status/education interactions fall slightly below the 5-percent
level of signicance.
As with divorce, widowhood is also associated with a lower stock share in the risky
asset. According to the estimates in Table 9, the eects of widowhood on the portfolio
share range between 3 and 10 percentage points for respondents with a high school degree
or below. For college graduates, however, the marginal eects are weakly positive for males
and weakly negative for females. The nal columns of the table report the estimates for
never-married households, an under-populated group among the older households in the
HRS sample. The marginal eects estimates on the never-married/education interaction
dummies suggest that marriage is associated with larger allocations in the risky assets for
all but female college graduates. Although the HRS estimates do not always share the
same signs as those predicted in our model simulations, they do suggest that marital status
may be an important factor in determining portfolio decisions, at least among the older
households represented in the survey.
The PSID results, reported in Table 10, suggest that marital status may be important for
the portfolio shares of younger households as well. Among high school graduates, divorce is
associated with a (statistically insignicant) gain of about 2.5 percentage points in the risky
share for males but a (statistically signicant) decline of 6.3 percentage points in the share
for females. The estimates for college graduates, in contrast, show little relationship at all
between divorce and portfolio allocations of either men or women, which is consistent with
potentially osetting eects or, perhaps, measurement error. The nal columns of Table
10 suggest that rst marriage may indeed be important for portfolio choice, but not in the
way our model predicts. According to the marginal eects estimates, male high school and
college graduates hold 5{7 percentage points more of their portfolios in stocks compared
with married households. For females the relationship between rst marriage and the risky
share is statistically close to zero for high school and college graduates and strongly and
signicantly negative for females with less than a high school degree.
The results in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that other variables that have an important
eect in the model simulations matter empirically as well|though again, not always with
the same direction of impact. The number of children living at home, for instance, is
associated with about a 1-percentage point decline in the share of risky assets. In all of
the regressions, the average ratio of cash on hand to income is positively and signicantly
34related to the portfolio share, which contrasts with the model's predictions of a negative
relationship between xt and the optimal share.47 Finally, the sign pattern on age and age-
squared in the HRS and PSID regressions suggest that the portfolio share in stocks follows
a hump-shaped pattern in the working life and then falls gradually in retirement.48
6 Conclusion
This paper nds that family shocks|sudden changes in resources and expectations induced
by transitions in marital status and family composition|can lead to sharp adjustments
in household savings and portfolio choice. We examine the role of family shocks by rst
analyzing simulation results from a life-cycle model of optimal saving, allocation, and life
insurance, where households are subject to uncertainty about marital status and children.
Results from the simulations indicate that family shocks can induce changes in optimal
portfolio shares of over 30 percentage points, with typical changes in the range of 10 to 15
percentage points. We nd that divorce and widowhood have particularly strong eects on
allocations, and that these eects dier signicantly by gender, as well as by the number
and ages of children. Widowhood reduces the optimal share of stocks for both men and
women, but the eects are especially pronounced for women. Divorce, in contrast, leads to
sharp portfolio adjustments in opposite directions for men and women, with men moving
to a riskier allocation and women to a safer one.
To test the empirical importance of marital status and children for portfolio choice, we
estimate the eect of family shocks on the share of risky assets using data from the HRS and
the PSID. The estimation results provide evidence that family shocks matter empirically, as
well as in the model simulations. Panel tobit regressions generate marginal eects estimates
on marital status indicators for divorce, marriage, and widowhood in the neighborhood of
5 to 10 percentage points. The signs of the estimates do not, however, always agree with
the direction of the impact predicted by the model.
The literature on optimal portfolio choice over the life cycle has focused on the roles of
housing costs, assumptions about preferences, stockmarket participation costs, and back-
ground risks due to uninsurable labor income. This study suggests that marital status
47This inconsistency is found in most studies of optimal portfolio choice over life-cycle. See, for example,
Cocco et al. (2005), Heaton and Lucas (2000), and Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
48This age pattern of portfolio choice has received mixed support in previous studies. Luo (2006) estimates
age proles of portfolio shares using cross-sectional data from the 2000 wave of the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) and nds evidence of a negative and signicant age eect. As Ameriks and Zeldes (2004)
argue, however, cross-sectional data make it impossible to disentangle age, time, and cohort eects without
strong identifying assumptions; analyzing a panel of TIAA-CREF data, they cannot reject the hypothesis
of no age eects. In a study of panel 401(k) data from a single large rm, however, Agnew et al. (2003) nd
that participants do tend to shift toward safer allocations with age. Controlling for cohort eects, Poterba
and Samwick (2001) also nd a declining age pattern of risky assets, starting from a peak around age 43.
35and children may be comparably important for understanding optimal portfolio decisions.
Future work on this topic could extend the framework in several ways in the direction
of realism and internal consistency. Along these lines, important improvements would in-
clude endogenizing changes in family composition (including fertility, marital matching,
and divorce) and providing a richer description of intrahousehold bargaining (e.g., deriving
decision weights as the outcome of Nash bargaining, as in Browning, 2000).
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Male Female Married Male Female Married
Fitted age polynomials
Constant -2.0753 -1.8593 -1.1018 -4.0447 -2.1728 -1.3505
Age 0.1625 0.1633 0.0812 0.3352 0.2383 0.1055
Age
2=100 -0.2902 -0.3026 -0.0889 -0.6589 -0.3960 -0.0801
Age
3=10000 0.1634 0.1803 0.0046 0.4167 0.2056 -0.0282
Replacement rate 0.8411 0.8370 0.8487 0.8274 0.7357 0.7421
Coecient estimates
Children age 0-1 0.0023 -0.0294 -0.0231 0.1725 -0.1560 -0.0399
(0.1317) (0.0265) (0.0049) (0.1673) (0.0768) (0.0078)
Children age 2-4 -0.0656 -0.0038 -0.0226 -0.0871 -0.0878 -0.0204
(0.0880) (0.0221) (0.0045) (0.1388) (0.0574) (0.0074)
Children age 5-7 0.0272 -0.0017 -0.0020 0.0905 -0.0744 -0.0148
(0.0614) (0.0197) (0.0045) (0.1236) (0.0481) (0.0075)
Children age 8-10 -0.0045 0.0048 0.0088 -0.0376 -0.0688 -0.0010
(0.0529) (0.0202) (0.0046) (0.1414) (0.0466) (0.0078)
Children age 11-12 0.0562 0.0371 0.0294 0.1415 -0.0262 0.0196
(0.0574) (0.0210) (0.0051) (0.1186) (0.0463) (0.0087)
Children age 13-15 0.0430 0.0795 0.0200 0.0062 0.0648 0.0304
(0.0489) (0.0200) (0.0052) (0.1083) (0.0445) (0.0090)
Children age 16-18 0.0289 0.1501 0.0454 0.0455 0.1331 0.0414
(0.0557) (0.0232) (0.0060) (0.0847) (0.0475) (0.0107)
Constant 9.4719 9.1591 9.9748 9.0156 7.9791 9.6519
(0.0546) (0.0579) (0.0212) (0.2549) (0.2119) (0.1051)
N 4339 5780 48127 1911 1980 20466




) 0.0099 0.0119 0.0092 0.0094 0.0169 0.0130
(0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0007)
Transitory (
2
) 0.0894 0.0851 0.0635 0.0786 0.0418 0.0588
(0.0254) (0.0153) (0.0068) (0.0218) (0.0124) (0.0070)
This table presents the tted age polynomials, coecient estimates, and variance decomposition from
separate xed-eects regressions (by education, gender, and marital status subsamples) of the natural
logarithm of income on a full set of age dummies and the number of children of dierent ages living
in the household. The data are taken from the 1980{2003 waves of the PSID. Income is the sum of
household labor income and public transfers less income and payroll taxes. We restrict the sample
to respondents aged 20{65 with no additional adults apart from a spouse living in the household,
and we exclude observations with incomes less than $3,000 or greater than $3,000,000. To estimate
the replacement rates, we rst run xed-eects regressions of log income on age dummies for each
education, gender, and marital status subsample for respondents aged 55 to 90 in the 1992{2006 waves
of the HRS. We then dene the replacement rate as the average income implied by the age dummy
coecient estimates for ages 55{62 divided by the average income for ages 67{80. The estimation




Male Female Married Male Female Married
Age -0.0218 -0.0049 -0.0006 -0.0218 -0.0049 -0.0006
(0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0035) (0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0035)
Age
2/100 0.0590 0.0114 -0.0015 0.0590 0.0114 -0.0015
(0.0266) (0.0213) (0.0082) (0.0266) (0.0213) (0.0082)
Age
3/10000 -0.0520 -0.0100 0.0011 -0.0520 -0.0100 0.0011
(0.0219) (0.0166) (0.0061) (0.0219) (0.0166) (0.0061)
Adults in HH 0.0061 -0.0267 -0.0107 0.0061 -0.0267 -0.0107
(0.0064) (0.0046) (0.0017) (0.0064) (0.0046) (0.0017)
1 child 0.0228 0.0170 0.0052 0.0228 0.0170 0.0052
(0.0123) (0.0085) (0.0026) (0.0123) (0.0085) (0.0026)
2 children -0.0011 0.0156 0.0052 -0.0011 0.0156 0.0052
(0.0168) (0.0109) (0.0030) (0.0168) (0.0109) (0.0030)
3+ children 0.0085 0.0367 0.0010 0.0085 0.0367 0.0010
(0.0274) (0.0159) (0.0040) (0.0274) (0.0159) (0.0040)
State UE Rate (pct) -0.0007 0.0017 0.0007 -0.0007 0.0017 0.0007
(0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0005)
Constant 0.4549 0.3206 0.2057 0.4549 0.3206 0.2057
(0.1285) (0.1112) (0.0469) (0.1285) (0.1112) (0.0469)
N 4395 6130 16892 4395 6130 16892
R-squared 0.004 0.012 0.014 0.004 0.012 0.014
This table reports the coecient estimates from separate xed-eects regressions (by education,
gender, and marital status subsamples) of the ratio of annual housing costs (mortgage payments
plus rent) to income on a cubic age polynomial, number of children of dierent ages living in the
household, number of adults in the household, and state unemployment rates.
Table 3







Men Women Men Women Men Women
 permanent income ($1000s) +19.13 +34.80 -20.78 -28.44 -20.78 -28.44
 net child support receipts ($1000s) +4.25 -4.25 -4.25 +4.25 { {
 wealth ($1000s) +64.00 +77.50 -90.00 -90.00 +100.00 0.00
 equiv. scales + 1.00 +0.55 -1.00 -0.55 -0.55 -0.55
This table reports the changes in household resources due to a change in marital status for 40-year-old
high school graduates with one 13-year-old child. The change in permanent income is a combination of the
marital status eect as well as the trend growth rate in the income proles. The change in wealth re
ects
only the change due to marriage, divorce, or widowhood, holding other saving constant. Before the change
in marital status, both single men and women are assumed to have $25,000 in permanent income, while
married couples are assumed to have $50,000 in permanent income, $200,000 in wealth, and a life insurance
policy for the husband with a death benet of $100,000. Note that child support is 17% of income for a
single child; divorce triggers a 55% reduction in assets (the 50/50 split plus an additional 5% in court fees);
and the formula for the equivalence scales is (A + K0:7)0:7, where A and K denote the number of adults
and children living in the household.
42Table 4
Portfolio shares by age in the PSID and the HRS
Ages Married Single men Single women
Conditional Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional Unconditional
20{30 0.44 0.15 0.49 0.11 0.44 0.07
30{40 0.43 0.19 0.46 0.15 0.45 0.10
40{50 0.44 0.18 0.46 0.14 0.50 0.15
50{60 0.58 0.23 0.60 0.16 0.60 0.14
60{70 0.57 0.23 0.60 0.17 0.60 0.15
70{80 0.55 0.23 0.56 0.16 0.55 0.14
This table reports the average stock shares for dierent age brackets and marital status groups conditional and
unconditional on participation in the stockmarket (dened as having a positive share). The stock share is the
ratio of the market value of stocks (directly-held, mutual funds, and investment trusts, excluding IRAs and
Keoghs) divided by net nancial wealth. For ages 20{50, we compute mean allocations using the 1999{2005
wealth supplements in the PSID (excluding the SEO oversample). For ages 50{80, we use the 1992{2006 waves
of the HRS. The means were calculated using the sampling weights in the HRS and the PSID.
43Table 5
Average simulated stock allocations by marital status and children
High School
Age All Married Never Married Divorced Widowed
Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids
Men
30{40 96.7 95.3 96.8 92.9 94.6 98.8 99.4 99.0 93.5 92.6
45{55 79.6 65.5 77.1 60.0 86.9 79.0 88.6 80.3 77.2 61.7
55{65 54.8 48.7 52.0 44.2 66.6 62.5 64.7 63.5 53.9 46.5
75{85 37.5 42.4 38.2 38.7 39.9 59.9 36.8 58.5 34.8 38.8
Women
30{40 95.9 92.3 95.9 92.1 98.9 96.5 95.4 89.4 67.6 61.7
45{55 76.5 59.8 76.5 59.5 83.3 67.3 77.9 59.7 59.3 42.9
55{65 52.7 45.1 51.8 44.0 61.1 53.2 57.1 48.3 43.8 36.2
75{85 37.6 40.2 38.1 38.6 43.5 52.1 42.0 48.1 33.7 34.3
College
Age All Married Never Married Divorced Widowed
Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids
Men
30{40 91.6 96.4 90.5 88.1 99.3 99.8 99.0 99.3 89.8 92.0
45{55 73.8 67.6 71.9 56.8 85.5 79.8 83.4 76.4 71.2 56.3
55{65 47.3 45.1 44.9 39.0 60.5 54.9 57.8 53.6 48.0 41.1
75{85 32.6 35.9 32.7 33.0 38.1 43.5 33.5 42.8 30.7 32.9
Women
30{40 87.2 91.0 87.8 85.5 98.8 97.5 77.1 68.9 66.1 64.1
45{55 67.0 54.6 70.4 55.6 70.0 57.2 55.2 43.3 56.3 42.3
55{65 43.1 38.6 44.4 38.5 44.1 40.3 40.4 36.0 39.1 33.5
75{85 31.9 33.2 32.3 32.7 35.2 35.5 33.9 34.4 29.8 29.6
This table presents the average simulated percentage shares in the risky asset by age, gender, and marital
status. The columns titled \Kids" and \No Kids" report results for households with at least one child
and no children, respectively. Averages are taken over 50,000 independent simulations of returns, income,
children, marital status, and mortality for the baseline specication of the model. The baseline model is
solved for a coecient of relative risk aversion  = 6, a correlation between stocks and permanent income
corrr;y = 0:15, and the pair of the discount factor  and the bequest parameter b that minimizes the sum of
squared deviations between the simulated and empirical median cash-on-hand to income ratios for 5-year age
brackets between 20 and 95. For high school graduates,  = 0:9215 and b = 3:25, and for college graduates,
 = 0:9050 and b = 4:00. See text for details.
44Table 6
Average simulated levels of cash on hand (in thousands) by marital status and children
High School
Age All Married Never Married Divorced Widowed
Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids
Men
30{40 100.3 126.5 122.6 160.0 46.7 66.6 51.9 74.5 93.8 125.2
45{55 192.5 287.9 222.3 337.6 93.8 143.8 93.9 155.2 162.0 278.7
55{65 283.1 361.9 324.2 415.9 138.3 178.0 137.7 185.9 248.7 348.0
75{85 285.1 279.7 316.7 320.0 159.2 146.7 151.6 130.5 279.2 293.7
Women
30{40 106.5 128.7 129.3 168.6 37.6 48.4 51.3 65.4 114.7 150.2
45{55 186.8 276.8 225.8 342.8 74.4 113.4 86.2 130.4 170.0 269.8
55{65 264.9 335.3 328.3 421.2 112.5 143.1 124.2 159.5 244.3 337.4
75{85 244.9 241.5 319.8 323.1 125.1 118.5 135.1 127.1 259.0 259.3
College
Age All Married Never Married Divorced Widowed
Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids
Men
30{40 168.6 124.8 190.5 239.0 50.3 64.8 72.3 87.0 147.6 170.0
45{55 332.5 387.2 376.0 547.1 125.4 184.0 144.4 216.4 255.9 409.4
55{65 518.1 553.1 587.6 735.6 191.0 246.3 218.7 280.4 415.0 573.1
75{85 565.7 493.8 620.6 595.7 253.5 246.4 287.9 253.9 564.5 566.2
Women
30{40 177.4 127.5 206.6 259.2 50.3 64.8 87.4 108.5 152.1 173.4
45{55 331.8 376.0 392.3 570.7 153.5 216.3 185.8 263.5 274.3 429.1
55{65 500.6 516.8 608.1 761.2 241.7 303.4 283.0 343.7 446.4 601.1
75{85 507.1 422.5 638.6 613.0 265.5 274.7 319.0 287.9 538.2 525.9
This table presents the average simulated levels of cash on hand by age, gender, and marital status. The columns
titled \Kids" and \No Kids" report results for households with at least one child and no children, respectively.
Averages are taken over 50,000 independent simulations of returns, income, children, marital status, and mortality
for the baseline specication of the model. The baseline model is solved for a coecient of relative risk aversion
 = 6, a correlation between stocks and permanent income corrr;y = 0:15, and the pair of the discount factor 
and the bequest parameter b that minimizes the sum of squared deviations between the simulated and empirical
median cash-on-hand to income ratios for 5-year age brackets between 20 and 95. For high school graduates,
 = 0:9215 and b = 3:25, and for college graduates,  = 0:9050 and b = 4:00. See text for details.
45Table 7













Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids
Men
30{40 4.6 -0.4 2.3 4.4 -5.4 -3.5 0.2 0.3 1.1 -2.3
45{55 -5.2 -9.5 9.4 18.8 -8.1 -4.9 -6.1 -11.6 -5.4 -6.3
55{65 -10.1 -11.1 9.2 15.8 -5.5 -2.0 -9.4 -13.6 -6.1 -6.5
75{85 -0.0 -21.2 -0.9 11.9 -4.2 -2.0 2.4 -17.9 -0.4 -4.7
Women
30{40 0.8 2.6 -2.7 -5.2 -37.6 -37.6 3.7 8.3 10.5 9.7
45{55 -3.0 3.1 -3.9 -3.8 -28.2 -20.9 0.9 7.4 1.8 1.6
55{65 -6.2 -3.4 -0.8 0.1 -15.7 -11.1 -3.3 0.4 -0.1 0.1













Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids
Men
30{40 -0.8 -1.6 8.2 7.5 -4.3 0.1 -3.7 -2.8 -10.8 -12.3
45{55 -12.0 -13.1 8.7 16.7 -10.7 -7.1 -9.2 -12.7 -6.3 -3.3
55{65 -12.7 -9.3 8.7 11.2 -4.5 -2.4 -9.9 -9.8 -5.6 -3.2
75{85 -3.1 -7.0 1.0 7.1 -2.6 -1.6 0.7 -7.2 -0.2 -2.3
Women
30{40 -6.4 -6.3 -12.5 -16.4 -37.0 -31.9 4.7 10.8 -0.3 -5.2
45{55 -8.6 0.2 -9.9 -8.7 -23.9 -18.4 7.1 10.7 -0.7 -4.5
55{65 -1.3 0.4 -2.6 -1.2 -10.6 -7.9 3.2 4.0 -1.4 -0.7
75{85 -4.2 -2.9 2.2 2.8 -4.0 -4.2 -2.2 -2.2 -1.7 -2.3
This table presents the simulated detrended percentage point changes in the portfolio allocation in stocks when
there is a transition to a new marital status. The change in the stock share is &    &, where  & denotes
the average change for each age bracket if there is no change in marital status, and & denotes the average
change for each age when marital status changes. The columns titled \Kids" and \No Kids" report results for
households with at least one child and no children, respectively. Averages are taken over 50,000 independent
simulations of returns, income, children, marital status, and mortality for the baseline specication of the
model. The baseline model is solved for a coecient of relative risk aversion  = 6, a correlation between
stocks and permanent income corrr;y = 0:15, and the pair of the discount factor  and the bequest parameter
b that minimizes the sum of squared deviations between the simulated and empirical median cash-on-hand to
income ratios for 5-year age brackets between 20 and 95. For high school graduates,  = 0:9215 and b = 3:25,
and for college graduates,  = 0:9050 and b = 4:00. See text for details.
46Table 8
Simulated changes in stock allocation for alternative specications
Married! divorced
Edu Age Baseline No Corr Low CRRA High CRRA
Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids
H.S. Men
45{55 9.4 18.8 6.6 17.2 2.9 8.1 13.8 15.6
75{85 -0.9 11.9 -2.7 12.8 0.4 14.7 2.4 8.1
Women
45{55 -3.9 -3.8 -3.1 -2.8 -0.3 -0.5 -4.4 -3.2
75{85 2.5 4.8 1.1 5.5 5.2 6.8 2.2 2.6
Col. Men
45{55 8.7 16.7 8.2 15.6 3.9 8.6 11.3 13.2
75{85 1.0 7.1 3.9 8.0 1.2 11.5 1.5 4.4
Women
45{55 -9.9 -8.7 -8.2 -8.8 -2.2 -5.5 -6.9 -5.4
75{85 2.2 2.8 3.2 3.3 4.2 5.0 1.1 1.4
Married! widowed
Edu Age Baseline No Corr Low CRRA High CRRA
Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids Kids No Kids
H.S. Men
50{55 -8.1 -4.9 -9.2 -5.2 -1.9 -2.9 -6.3 -2.3
70{80 -4.2 -2.0 -5.8 -2.1 -6.9 -2.6 -2.2 -1.5
Women
50{55 -28.2 -20.9 -28.5 -22.7 -17.4 -23.9 -22.4 -13.0
70{80 -6.6 -6.8 -7.1 -7.5 -10.0 -9.4 -5.2 -5.3
Col. Men
50{55 -10.7 -7.1 -10.6 -7.7 -4.6 -4.8 -4.2 -2.5
70{80 -2.6 -1.6 -2.5 -1.8 -4.2 -1.8 -1.4 -0.9
Women
50{55 -23.9 -18.4 -24.5 -20.1 -18.2 -21.7 -13.8 -10.2
70{80 -4.0 -4.2 -4.8 -4.7 -5.2 -5.3 -2.8 -3.0
This table displays the simulated detrended percentage point changes in the portfolio allocation
in stocks when there is a transition to either divorce or widowhood. \Baseline" is solved for a
coecient of relative risk aversion  = 6 and a correlation between asset returns and permanent
income of 0.15. \No Corr" sets the correlation between asset returns and permanent income to 0.
\Low CRRA" alters the baseline specication by setting  = 4. \Low CRRA" alters the baseline
specication by setting  = 8. For each specication, the discount factor  and the bequest
parameter b are chosen to minimize the squared deviations between the simulated and empirical
median net wealth levels for 5-year age brackets between 20 and 95. The estimated values for 
and b are reported in the main text. The change in the stock share is &   &, where  & denotes
the average change for each age bracket if there is no change in marital status, and & denotes
the average change for each age when marital status changes. The columns titled \Kids" report
results for households with at least one child. The columns titled \No Kids" report results for
households with no children. See text for details.
47Table 9
RE tobit regressions of stock share on marital transitions, HRS
Divorced Widowed Never-married
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Marital  Dropout -0.046 -0.035 -0.064*** -0.096*** -0.084* -0.111**
(0.029) (0.032) (0.015) (0.008) (0.038) (0.037)
Marital  High School -0.044** -0.040** -0.052*** -0.028*** -0.077** -0.018
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.025) (0.025)
Marital  College -0.028 -0.022 0.016 -0.010 -0.035 0.007
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.026) (0.027)
Nonwhite -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.087*** -0.092*** -0.091***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Health -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Wealth-income ratio 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.003 -0.011** -0.005 -0.013*** -0.003 -0.010*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age sq./100 0.001 0.007* 0.003 0.008*** 0.001 0.006*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
High School 0.011 0.021** 0.011 0.018** 0.013* 0.023***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
College 0.125*** 0.100*** 0.122*** 0.093*** 0.126*** 0.103***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 26210 23696 27084 30653 25532 22518
This table reports marginal eects from separate random eects tobit regressions of the stock share on mar-
ital status and other household characteristics. Separate regressions were estimated for men and women
in each of three marital status categories: \Divorced" includes respondents who are either divorced or
married; \Widowed" includes those who are widowed or married; and \Never-married" includes those
who are either never-married or married. The interpretation of the indicator variable \Marital x Edu" de-
pends on the subsample, such that \Marital" corresponds to \Divorced," \Widowed," or \Never-married,"
depending on the column of interest. \Health" is an indicator for whether self-reported health takes a
value of 3{5, on a scale of 1{5, with higher values indicating worse health. \Wealth-income ratio" is the
average ratio of net wealth to income. Data taken from the 1992{2006 waves of the HRS and restricted
to respondents aged 60 to 90. The stock share is the net value of stocks (directly-held, mutual funds,
and investment trusts) divided by net nancial wealth. Asterisks denote the following levels of statistical
signicance: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001. See text for details.
48Table 10
RE tobit regressions of stock share on marital transitions, PSID
Divorced Never-married
Male Female Male Female
Marital  Dropout -0.044 -0.051 -0.017 -0.135***
(0.029) (0.047) (0.041) (0.039)
Marital  High School 0.024 -0.063*** 0.056* 0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.027)
Marital  College 0.001 0.003 0.070** 0.005
(0.016) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027)
Nonwhite -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Children in HH -0.009*** -0.007** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Wealth-to-income ratio 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.006*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age sq./100 -0.007*** -0.006** -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
High School 0.017 0.012 0.011 0.018
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
College 0.125*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.125***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
N 17392 17187 16984 16753
This table reports marginal eects from separate random eects tobit regres-
sions of the stock share on marital status, children living at home, and other
household characteristics. Separate regressions were estimated for men and
women and for two marital status categories: \Divorced" includes respondents
who are either divorced or married, and \Never-married" includes those who are
either never-married or married. The interpretation of the indicator variable
\Marital x Edu" depends on the subsample, such that \Marital" corresponds
to \Divorced" or \Never-married," depending on the column of interest. \Chil-
dren in HH" is the number of children living at home. \Wealth-income ratio"
is the average ratio of net wealth to income. Data taken from the 1999{2005
wealth supplements in the PSID and restricted to respondents aged 20 to 70.
The stock share is the net value of stocks (directly-held, mutual funds, and in-
vestment trusts) divided by net nancial wealth. Asterisks denote the following
levels of statistical signicance: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001. See
text for details.





























































































Estimated income proles: This gure displays the average income proles (in thousands of 2006 dollars)
by marital status and education. The proles are constructed using the coecient estimates and tted age
polynomials reported in Table 1, with the number of children living at home set to zero. The data for
working-age incomes come from the 1980{2003 waves of the PSID, and the replacement rate of retirement
income is calculated using the 1992{2006 waves of the HRS.


























































































































































































































Comparison of simulated and empirical wealth levels: This gure compares the median levels of cash
on hand from the HRS and PSID with the median proles from the model simulations for married couples,
single males, and single females (in 2006 dollars). The median wealth levels for ages 20{65 were calculated
using the 1999{2005 wealth supplements in the PSID. The medians for ages 65{95 were calculated using
the 1992{2006 waves of the HRS. The samples are restricted to observations with cash on hand between $0
and $3,000,000 and incomes greater than $3,000. The simulated proles were generated with a coecient of
relative risk aversion  = 6 and the pair of the discount factor  and the bequest parameter b that minimizes
the sum of squared deviations between the simulated and empirical median cash-on-hand to income ratios
for 5-year age brackets between 20 and 95. For high school graduates,  = 0:9215 and b = 3:25, and for
college graduates,  = 0:9050 and b = 4:00. See text for details.































































Simulated consumption, cash on hand, and life insurance: This gure shows the average simulated
levels of household consumption, Ct, cash on hand, Xt, and the face value of life insurance, Qt, for all
married and single male high school graduates (left panel) and college graduates (right panel). Averages
are taken over 50,000 independent simulations of returns, income, children, marital status, and mortality for
the baseline specication of the model. The baseline model is solved for a coecient of relative risk aversion
 = 6, a correlation between stocks and permanent income corrr;y = 0:15, and the pair of the discount factor
 and the bequest parameter b that minimizes the sum of squared deviations between the simulated and
empirical median cash-on-hand to income ratios for 5-year age brackets between 20 and 95. For high school
graduates,  = 0:9215 and b = 3:25, and for college graduates,  = 0:9050 and b = 4:00.

























































































































































Simulated cash on hand and portfolio shares for married families with and without children:
The top two panels of the gure show the average simulated levels of cash on hand, Xt, for married high
school (left panel) and college (right panel) graduates with children (solid red line) and without children
(dashed blue line). The bottom two panels show the simulated portfolio share, &t. Averages are taken over
50,000 independent simulations of returns, income, children, marital status, and mortality for the baseline
specication of the model. The baseline model is solved for a coecient of relative risk aversion  = 6, a
correlation between stocks and permanent income corrr;y = 0:15, and the pair of the discount factor  and
the bequest parameter b that minimizes the sum of squared deviations between the simulated and empirical
median cash-on-hand to income ratios for 5-year age brackets between 20 and 95. For high school graduates,
 = 0:9215 and b = 3:25, and for college graduates,  = 0:9050 and b = 4:00.
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Percentage point change in portfolio shares due to divorce or widowhood (high school): This
gure shows the percentage point change in the portfolio share in risky assets due to a transition to divorce
or widowhood for male and female high school graduates. The left panels show the changes for men, and
the right panels show the changes for women. The percentage point change is calculated using the decision
rules for optimal portfolio choice, holding the realizations of permanent income, transitory income, and asset
returns to their expected values. See text for details.
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Percentage point change in portfolio shares due to divorce or widowhood (college): This gure
shows the percentage point change in the portfolio share in risky assets due to a transition to divorce or
widowhood for male and female college graduates. The left panels show the changes for men, and the right
panels show the changes for women. The percentage point change is calculated using the decision rules for
optimal portfolio choice, holding the realizations of permanent income, transitory income, and asset returns
to their expected values. See text for details.
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Eect of children on the change in portfolio shares due to divorce or widowhood (high school):
This gure shows the percentage point change in the portfolio share in risky assets due to a transition to
divorce or widowhood for male and female high school graduates. In the plots, divorced individuals are 45
years old and widowed individuals are 80 years old. The solid red line shows the change for households
without children, and the dashed blue line shows the change for a household with two children born in the
\early" period and one child born in the \late" period. The left panels show the changes for men, and
the right panels show the changes for women. The percentage point change is calculated using the decision
rules for optimal portfolio choice, holding the realizations of permanent income, transitory income, and asset
returns to their expected values. See text for details.
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Eect of children on the change in portfolio shares due to divorce or widowhood (college):
The gure shows the percentage point change in the portfolio share in risky assets due to a transition to
divorce or widowhood for male and female college graduates. In the plots, divorced individuals are 45 years
old and widowed individuals are 80 years old. The solid red line shows the change for households without
children, and the dashed blue line shows the change for a household with two children born in the \early"
period and one child born in the \late" period. The left panels show the changes for men, and the right
panels show the changes for women. The percentage point change is calculated using the decision rules for
optimal portfolio choice, holding the realizations of permanent income, transitory income, and asset returns
to their expected values. See text for details.
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